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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
UTAH STATE ROAD
COMMISSION and DIYISION OF
STATE LANDS OF THE
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiffs-Respondents . Case No.
12217
vs.

·1

HARDY SALT COMPANY, a
Defendant-Appellant.
corporation,

1

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT \VITH RESPECT TO
LENGTH OF BRIEF
The State of Utah files this brief, exceeding the 50page limitation, pursuant to permission granted by this
Court's special order of .February 16, 1971.
Counsel for the State of Utah appreciate the soundness of this Court's rule limiting the length of briefs to
50 pages. Nearly all cases can be adequately briefed

within that limitation, and it probably is true that even
in complex cases a brief will be more effective if it does
not exceed the 50-page limitation.
In the early drafts of this brief, Counsel made a
genuine effort to keep within the page limitation. But,
perhaps prompted in large measure by the important
implications of this case to the State of Utah, the tendency was to include material that seemed useful by way
of background and explanation, as well as argument.
The result was a dilemna as to whether the brief should
be shortened at the risk of incompleteness, or whether it
should be complete at the risk of being more burdensome
than useful to the Court.
The final compromise is the present brief, which
presents a rather thorough exploration and argument of
the issues, but which strives for utility to the Court
through its organizational format. A Summary of Argument section is included, which develops in skeleton form
the thread of argument appearing in the more lengthy
Argument section. The Table of Contents includes an
itemization of each major point argued, along with a
reference citing two separate pages where the discussion
of the particular point begins. The first page reference
is to the Summary of Argument and the second page
reference is to the Argument.
While the length seems formidable, the Summary
of Argument, as keyed to the Argument through the
Table of Contents, should thus permit a rather rapid
evaluation of the issues and the respective arguments of
2

the parties, while the Argument section affords extended discussion of whatever points most interest or concern
the Court. It is hoped that this approach, despite the
length of the brief, will actually conserve the time of the
Court.
As a final note, some background material is included as Appendix C. This information is not controYerted and is not argumentative, and really does not require inclusion in the body of the brief. But it does contain an important discussion of the historical and factual
setting of this litigation, so as to place the legal issues in
clearer perspective, and it does comment upon the original action of the United States Supreme Court between
Utah and the United States.

NATURE OF THE CASE
In 1850, the United States Government surveyed
a meander line around the shore of the Great Salt Lake,
delineating the public domain from the bed of the lake.
In 1855 this survey was accepted by the United States
Surveyor General, and the line as surveyed has been
plotted on official plats and maps, and is known as the
official surveyed meander line of the lake. Between that
line and the present level of the lake lies a belt of 374,000
acres of land. This case is a dispute over the ownership
of 32.2 acres of that land.
The Hardy Salt Company, defendant below and
appellant before this Court, owns fee land patented by

3

the United States and located adjacent to the exposed
bed of the lake. The Utah State Road Commission, in '
the construction of Interstate 80, was required to condemn part of Hardy's fee land, and instituted this action
as an eminent domain proceeding for that purpose.
Hardy filed a counterclaim, asserting that, in addition
to the fee land taken, it also owned adjoining mud flats
by virtue of the doctrine of reliction, and that 32.2 acres
of mud flat "relictions" had been physically taken for
the highway without compensation to Hardy.
The Division of State Lands was joined as a party,
the counterclaim of Hardy was denied by the State, and
the litigation has proceeded to determine the merits of
Hardy's counterclaim. Thus, title to only 32.2 acres will
be directly adjudicated in this action, but the legal issues
necessarily involved ha,'e general application to the en·
tire belt of land, generally identified in this brief as "exposed" lands.

DESIGNATION O:F PARTIES ON APPEAL
The conflict is between the State of Utah, repre·
sented bv its Division of State Lands and Road Com·
mision, ;nd the Hardy Salt Company, a corporation. To
facilitate identification of the parties on appeal, the Division of State Lands is referred to either as the State
of Utah or the State, and the Hardy Salt Company is
referred to as Hardy. "\\Then reference is made to the
State Hoad Commission, it is so identified.

ISSUE TO BE DECIDED
The issue to be decided on appeal is whether the
common law doctrine of reliction (a part of the common
law regime of riparian rights) applies and operates to
divest the State of Utah of its title to part of the bed of
the Great Salt Lake. In resolving this question, a number of additional questions are necessarily encountered,
all requiring resolution before the reliction question can
be determined. These questions are summarized in the
section next succeeding, which explains the trial court's
disposition of all of the significant issues involved in this
appeal.
DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COURT
The lower court held that the land in dispute was
owned by the State of Utah. The Findings of Fact are
recited in full in the Statement of Facts section of this
brief, the Conclusions of Law are recited in full as Appendix A, and the Judgment and Decree as Appendix
B. Summa1·ized, the essence of the lower court's Findings and Conclusions is that:
I. Title to the bed of the Great Salt Lake vested in the State of C tah at the date of Statehood
(.January 4, 1896) pursuant to the Equal
ing doctrine under the United S!ates Constitution because the lake was a navigable body of
on that date.
2. The bed of the lake at Statehood consisted
of all of the area within the surveyed meander
line of the lake. The suveyed meander line fairly
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represents the mean high water line of the lake at
statehood, and thus is the boundary between the
state owned bed and the privately owned uplands.
Since statehood, and continuing to the present
day, the meander line has been a fixed and per- '
manent boundary line that has not changed or
fluctuated.
3. The State has not been divested of any part
of its title to the bed of the lake because the common law doctrine of reliction is not applicable to
the Great Salt Lake. The criteria of that doctrine
permit it to apply only when a lowered water
level is the result of natural causes, is gradual
and imperceptible, and permanent. The fluctuating water level of the Great Salt Lake is not
the result of natural causes, is not gradual and
imperceptible, and is not permanent.
4. Even if the common law doctrine of reliction
should be deemed applicable, the Utah Constitution protects state ownership of the beds of navigable lakes, and no common law doctrine can
divest the State of its title. The title of the State
can only be divested or encumbered through a
direct act of the Utah Legislature or when an appropriate state officer or agency affirmatively
acts in accordance with authority specifically
granted by the Legislature.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties have endeavored, at substantial expense, to obtain all material facts that can be obtained
with respect to the issues in this case, and to submit such
facts by stipulation, with clarifying comments where
there might be a degree of conjecture and with each

6

party reserving for argument the legal effect of such
facts. Consequently, there is little need to "argue" the
facts, and perhaps the most direct presentation would be
to ( 1) recite the facts as found by the lower court, ( 2)
respond to Hardy's reference to these facts, and (3)
comment on the burden of proof. The State will proceed
in that order.
A. Facts as Found by the Lower Court:
I. On January 4, 1896, when Utah obtained
statehood, the Great Salt Lake was a body of
water located entirely within the State of Utah,
having a length of 77 miles, a width of 32.5 miles,
and a depth in excess of 30 feet. The area of the
lake which had a depth of 25 feet or more was substantial, being several miles in width and extending virtually the entire length of the lake. (R.
284)

2. On January 4, 1896, the Great Salt Lake
was navigable in fact. It was physically capable
of supporting steamships, sailboats, barges, and
other commercial water craft of the types then
commonly used on navigable waters. Boats have
been used on the lake at, before and after the time
of statehood for commercial purposes, including
hauling ore, livestock, transporting passengers
for hire, pleasure craft for hire, brine shrimp harvesting, construction of a railroad trestle and
causeway, and also for law enforcement patrol
and rescue, scientific exploration, and other miscellaneous purposes. The boats have ranged in
size from small craft to barges capable of hauling
per trip loads of 4,000 tons. (R. 284)
3. In large part, the forces which have caused
the water level of the Great Salt Lake to lower,
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both before and after the time of statehood, have
not been natural, gradual and imperceptible, or
permanent; but have been artificial acts and interferences by man, have been rapid and substantial, and have been erratic, temporary, and widely
fluctuating. Specifically:
a. The diversions, impoundments and consumptive uses by man on the tributaries of the
Great Salt Lake lowered the water level four
vertical feet between 1850 and the date of statehood, and 5.3 feet by 1968. This artificial, nonnatural interference resulted in exposing approximately 272,000 acres of shorelands by
statehood and approximately 37 4,000 acres by
1968. ( R. 285)
b. The water level fluctuates substantially
and rapidly, rather than slowly and imperceptibly. Illustrative of this fluctuation is the fact
that, from September 1, 1966 to December 31,
1966, the water level lowered more than two
vertical feet, exposing more than 140,000 acres
in 122 days, or nearly 1,200 acres a day; conversely, the lake rises just as rapidly, illustrated by the fact that in the 92-day period from
July 1, 1964 to September 30, 1964, the water
level rose approximately 1.75 vertical feet,
covering approximately 120,000 acres, or a rate
exceeding 1,200 acres per day. Other fluctuations ordinarily are not as dramatic, but they
are comparable. (R. 285)
c. The water level of the Great Salt Lake has
not stabilized at any time since statehood so as
to represent a permanent level or regular cycle
of fluctuation; the water level is never the same
for two consecutive months, and does not show
a pattern of approximating the same level for
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comparable seasons, months, or time periods
year to year; and, ordinarily, the fluctuation from month to month inundates or exposes
?f acres, since a change of one
mch elenttlon will cover or uncoyer approximately 5,667 acres. ( R. 285)
4. The Great Salt Lake was surveyed under the
direction of Captain Howard Stansbury in 1850
for the express purpose of locating and establishing a mean high water mark which would segregate the bed of the lake from the public domain;
difficulties were encountered during that survey
in locating such a mark either by a vegetation line
or a wave action erosion line, because the briny
waters have saturated surrounding lands with
salts which prevent the growth of any definitive
vegetation line, and the very flat shore lands,
coupled with highly fluctuating water levels, prevent the formation of any mark from wave erosion; there is no reason to believe that the meander
line sureveyed by Stansbury at what he considered to he the high water line was not as accurate
as any such line that could have been surveyed at
that time or at any subsequent time; the uncontroverted evidence shows that, at the date of
statehood, the water level of the lake was at the
same level as it had been at the time of the Stansbury smTey in the Spring of 1850, and, if there
had been no artificial diversions prior to statehood the water level at statehood would have
been' four feet higher than it was at the time of
Stansbury's survey; for thirty years prior to statehood
water level of the lake had been substantially higher than it was at the time of Stansbury's survey, and during 23 of those 30 years,
the actual water level reached or exceeded
survey line located by Stansbury as the mean high
9

water line; the Division of State Lands (and its
predecessors) of the State of Utah has under
from the Utah Attorney General
Legislative mandate, administered, managed, leased,
and developed the shore lands located below the
line as sureveyed by Stansbury, and has
v_1ewed the meander line as the fixed boundary
lme, the surveyed meander line is a clearly identifiable line appearing on all official federal, state
and county land records, and is the described
boundary in all patents issued by the United
States; no mean high water line could have been
determined at statehood by reference to a physical mark on the ground, and none could be determined today; because of an earthquake in 1934,
it is now impossible to survey a line to determine
any elevation above mean sea level as such elevation appeared prior to 1934; and, in general, the
surveyed meander line represents a fixed, permanent, identifiable boundary line to separate
private uplands from the state-owned bed of the
Great Salt Lake, reasonably approximates what
the mean high water mark of the lake would have
been at statehood if the nature of the lake and its
waters would have permitted a mark to form, and
reasonably approximates what the mean high
water line would be today if there had been no
artificial interferences with the flow of the tributaries into the lake. ( R. 285-7)
B. Hardy's Reference to the Lower Court's Findings of Fact:
The above references to the Record indicate the
pages where the court's Findings appear, rather than
the evidence supporting the Findings. Such evidence is
discussed, however, and specifically cited when the rele10

vant facts are discussed in the Argument Section of the
brief.
Hardy does not dispute the essential facts as found
by the trial court, but there are references by Hardy at
pp. 8-14 of its brief which suggest that in some instances
the court made findings not fully supported by the record. These claims by Hardy will be examined seriatim:
1. At pages 8-10 of its brief, Hardy quotes the preliminary part of the lower court's Finding No. 3, but

does not quote the three subparagraphs (a through c)
where the court specifically detailed the essence of the
Finding to show that "in large part" the impoundments
and diversions on the tributaries to the lake have caused
the water level to lower. Hardy says nothing that contradicts the Finding, but suggests that the causes of the
lowering water level cannot be "established with precision or exactness"; then quotes an earlier article which
suggested that "it is difficult to isolate the effect of
man's activities on the lake level"; and finally concedes
that "the parties have stipulated that a recent study by
the Utah Department of Resources presents the most
current and reliable information" about man's diversions
from the tributaries of the lake and the resultant impact
on the water level. (See pp. 8-9 of Hardy's brief)
There is nothing to argue here, but Hardy devoted
three pages of its brief to argue that the lower court
could not measure "with precision and exactness" the
influences that man's activities had made on the level of
the lake. Again, the court made no claim of precision and
11

exactness, but simply found that "in large part" the reason for the lowered water level was man's impoundments
on and diversions from the lake's tributaries. Furthel'
the figures used in the court's Finding were based
and completely consistent with Exhibit P-D-II, introduced jointly by the parties, with the stipulation that it
was the most accurate data which they had been able to
develop.

2. The second challenge by Hardy to the accuracy
of the court's findings appears on pages 10-12 of its brief.
Hardy questions that part of Finding No. 4, which says .
that the lake level in 1850 was essentially the same as at
statehood (January 4, 1896). It is difficult to grasp

Hardy's argument. The court made its Finding from
Exhibit P-T, a copy of the official hydrograph kept by
the \Yater Resources Branch of the United States Geological Survey. Hardy stipulated to the accuracy of this .
Exhibit in the lower court ( T. 68) and admits now that
it is based on the only data available to U.S.G.S. (data
gathered by E. C. LaRue, see page 11 of Hardy's
brief) . In sum, the court's Finding (a) is based on the
best and only evidence available, ( b) is part of official
Government records, ( c) is represented by a stipulation
of the parties, and ( d) there is no evidence-and none
suggested-showing any lake level in 1850 other than
that demonstrated on the official hydrograph.
3. The third item raised by Hardy, at pages 12-13

of its brief, is that Exhibit P-Q was only a "preliminary
estimate" of artificial diYersions from the lake before
12

statehood. This is true, but totally immaterial. The material fact was that during the second hearing in the trial
court, some fifteen months after the first hearing when
the preliminary estimate (Exhibit P-Q) was made, the
parties by stipulation introduced Exhibit P-D-II (prepared by the Utah Board of 'Vater Resources and the
Utah Mineralogical and Geological Survey, in consultation with the United States Geological Survey). It was
the latter exhibit that was the basis of the court's findings
in this regard, and there is no instance where the court
made any finding inconsistent with Exhibit P-D-II.
4. The fourth point argued by Hardy, at pages 13-

15 of its brief, takes no direct issue with any fact found

by the court, but suggests that the surveyed meander line
did not locate the water's edge, but was based on "some
practical variation of the 'mean high water mark' concept." This is true, but hardly supports Hardy in this
litigation, since Captain Stansbury made his best effort,
using the best physical evidence available, to locate the
high water line (Exhibit P-V, pp. 35-36) .

C. Comment on Burden of Proof
The few instances where Hardy has commented on
the facts as found by the lower court, and as discussed
above, are really quite immaterial to the legal issues to
be considered. But, it is of some importance to emphasize
that Hardy has made its assertions by, in effect, attemptits own exhibits. This is particularly iming to
portant in light of the fact that in 11-0 single instance did
13

Hardy suggest any controverting evidence in the record,
or otherwise. There is no claim whatsoever by Hardy
that the record controverts any of the Findings, but only
that the facts in the record might not be absolute and
precise. If this be assumed to be true, arguendo, it is not
sufficient to upset such findings on appeal, and, some.
what more critical so far as Hardy is concerned, Hardv
has the burden of proof in this proceeding. The parties
have not made an issue of burden of proof, but have en·
deavored to present all undisputed facts that could be
obtained. However, since the property in dispute was
claimed by Hardy by virtue of a counterclaim filed
against the State, Hardy has the burden of proving its
ownership as alleged therein. To the extent that Hardy
wishes to make burden of proof an issue on appeal, then
Hardy must produce the evidence to prove its claim of
ownership. It has not done so.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A.

STATE LA,V, RATHER THAN FEDER
AL DETERMINES THE ISSUES IN DIS·
'
PUTE
Hardy contends on page 17 of its brief that "As to
each of these issues (i.e., every issue involved in thi)
appeal) ... federal and not state law applies."
argues the source of law question at pages 19-26 of its
brief. The State agrees that federal decisional law must
apply to determine the navigability of the Great
Lake, but argues that the law of Utah, as found in ib
14

constitution, statutes and court decisions, must apply to
determine all other questions.
The essence of the State's position is that, once the
lake is determined to be navigable under federal law and
title vests in the State, then any question as to whether
common law doctrines can divest the State of its title
must be answered by rules of state property law, and not
by federal decisional law.
Hardy falls into two basic errors in its discussion of
source of law, namely: (I) a failure to distinguish between those cases construing the effect of federal patents
(clearly a federal question) and those cases applying
rules of property law to determine ownership claims
where the validity or meaning of the patent is not in question (no federal question) ; and ( 2) a failure to recognize
that a "federal question" must be present before federal
decisional law is to be applied. Otherwise, federal decisional law would (or could) be extended to local probate
proceedings, divorce law, adoptions, mortgages, ad, infinitum.
The State traces the basis of source of law from the
United States Constitution through the major relevant
decisions of the United States Supreme Court. It is
shown that, even before Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
( 1938) , the local law of the states was always applied to
determine questions of ownership of real property. Specifically, with respect to rights of upland or littoral
owners adjacent to navigable waters, it is shown that
these questions have always been matters of state law.
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The United States Supreme Court has always held that
the mere fact that one claims land derived through a federal patent does not create a federal question, or every
land title dispute in the \V estern United States would be
decided by federal common law. Utah concludes the
source of law discussion by explaining the holding and
impact of the six cases cited by Hardy, showing that they
do not aid Hardy's position in this case.
B.

UTAH RECEIVED TITLE TO THE BED
OF THE GREAT SALT LAKE ON JANUARY 4, 1896, \VHEN UTAH BECAME A
STATE
1. Navigability as a Basis of State Title

The original thirteen states that formed the Federal Union were, as successors to the British Crown, the
owners of the beds of all navigable waters. \iVhen they
adopted the Federal Constitution, they retained that
ownership and granted to the United States only a regulatory power over interstate and foreign commerce. As
other states were subsequently admitted into the Federal
U ni'on, their enabling acts recited that they were to be
admitted on equal footing with all other states, with
equal sovereign rights and powers. The United States
Supreme Court has always held that the ownership of
beds of navigable waters is both a sovereign and a proprietary prerogative of the states, and that all states subsequently admitted into the Union thus receive automatically at statehood title to the beds of navigable
waters. There is no dispute on this point, and this dis16

eussion is simply to show the basis of title in the State of
Utah to the beds of those waters which were navigable
on January 4, 1896.
2. Facts Showing Navigable Capacity

In order for Utah to have received title to the Great
Salt Lake at statehood, the lake must have been, on that
date, navigable under the test of navigabality applied in
the federal courts. The test is necessarily a federal question requiring the application of federal decisional law
because the result of any determination of navigability
will cause the United States to lose title, and involves the
application of the United States Constitution and the
state enabling acts passed by Congress.
The federal test of navigability is whether the body
of water \Vas physically capable of supporting commercial navigation at statehood and not whether it in fact
had been used for such purposes. Hardy has not seriously disputed the navigability of the lake under this test,
hut has pointed out that while this Court has previously
taken judicial notice of the lake's navigability, it has
never been adjudicated on the physical facts. Since the
United States Supreme Court has found intermittent
stream flows with a three foot depth to be navigable,
despite the fact they have never been navigated for commercial purposes, it seems almost absurd to question the
navigability of the Great Salt Lake, which has had substantial commercial navigation and which at statehood
was 77 miles long, 32.5 miles wide, and 30 feet deep.
17

C.

UTAH HAS NOT BEEN DIVESTED OF
ANY PART OF ITS TITLE TO THE BED
OFTHEGREATSALTLAKE
I. The Doctrine of Reliction is not Applicable to

the exposed Lands Around the Great Salt Lake

a. Development of the Doctrine
The initial observation to be made about reliction is
that it evolved at common law as part of the riparian
rights accorded to one who owned land adjacent to a
body of water. Utah, from the beginning, rejected the
doctrine of riparian rights and adopted the law of appropriation with respect to water rights. Therefore, the
doctrine of reliction should apply only to the extent that
it is consistent with Utah statutes and present concepts
of property ownership, and certainly should not be expanded beyond its common law application.
At common law, reliction was applied to hold that
an owner of land adjacent to navigable water was entitled to "relictions" formed when the mean high water
line of the body of water lowered from natural causes, in
a gradual and imperceptible manner, and the lowering
was permanent.
b. Federal Decisions
The question as to whether reliction should apply
in this case is a matter of Utah law, not federal law.
Nevertheless, the State has cited several cases purportedly applying federal law, simply to show that there is
no consistency or uniformity in those decisions.
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c. State Court Decisions

Decisions from other states might be persuasive to
the Utah Court if they were well reasoned and uniform,
;o but they are not, and the State cites a number of cases
:e from other states to show that they have struggled inconclusively with the doctrine of reliction.

is

d. Utah Decisions

This Court has not directly and specifically declared
a the measure or limit of the doctrine of reliction in Utah.
1e It has been held that reliction can apply, but not to divest
•- the State of any title which it received at statehood. This
e Court has specifically reserved for decision the question
as to whether artificial interferences with stream flows,
:s causing a lake level to lower, will result in reliction of
the exposed lands.

n

.t
r

[}

s

e. Physical Characteristics of the Fluctuating
Water Level
( 1) The Great Salt Lake has not lowered by acts

of nature so much as by acts of man, since the cumulative
effect of withdrawals from the tributaries of the lake by
man had lowered its level by 5.3 vertical feet by 1968
and exposed 37 4,000 acres of so-called "reliction" land.
(2) The water level has not lowered gradually and
imperceptibly, since it is common for more than 1,200

acres to be inundated or exposed in a single day, and for
this process to continue for several months (e.g., exposing more than 140,000 acres in 122 days; covering
120,000 acres in 92 days).
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( 3) The fluctuating water level does not represent
a permanent change, for the lake is never permanent in
its water level, and a change of one inch in elevation will
either cover or uncover an average of 5,667 acres.

In brief, the level of the Great Salt Lake is not the
result of natural causes, and certainly does not represent
a gradual, imperceptible, and permanent change.
f. Practical Considerations

The State advances a number of practical observations to show how unrealistic it would be to apply the
doctrine of reliction to water levels raised or lowered by
artifical forces. Perhaps most persuasive is the fact that
if Hardy's argument were to be adopted, then projects
such as Glen Canyon and Flaming Gorge (dams located
on navigable rivers) could impound water and flood
homes, schools and ranches with impunity-for if arti·
ficial depletion causes the State to lose title, then artificial impoundments must cause the State to gain title.
Obviously, reliction should not apply to artificial mani·
pulations of water surfaces.
2. No Common Law Doctrine Can Divest the State

of its Title to the Bed of the Great Salt Lake

Here the State examines at length earlier decisions
of this Court, acts of the Utah legislature, opinions of
the lJtah Attornev General, administrative acts of the
Utah Land Board. (now Division of State Lands) and a
provision of the Utah Constitution to show that bed: of
navigable waters in Utah are protected by a constitu·
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tional charge and may be divested only by an affirmative
aet of the Utah Legislature or by express statutes authorizing encumbrances or sales. No common law concept or doctrine can invade or defeat State ownership
declared to be protected by the state Constitution. Accordingly, Utah has, since statehood, possessed, administered and managed the lakebed lands in accordance
with the Utah Constitution, statutes and court decisions.
3. The Surveyed Meander Line of the Great Salt

Lake, in Law and Fact, was at Statehood-and
Still is-the High Water Line of the Lake

a. The High Water Line is Usually Located
at the High Water Mark
The State owned bed of a lake is measured by the
high water line, usually a mark caused by wave action
erosion or a vegetation line, created when the water level
is at its ordinary high cycle. The bed, under ordinary
circumstances, thus consists of that portion which is
water covered and that portion between the water level
and the high water line. The Great Salt Lake, unlike
most bodies of fresh water, is too salty to permit a vegetation line mark, and is too flat to permit a wave action
erosion mark. Consequently, it is impossible to locate any
"mark" to identify a high water line around the lake that
could be, or could have been, more precise than the meander line as surveyed by Captain Stansbury in 1850.
b. A Surveyed Meander Line may be J:'resumed in Law to be the High Water Lme
If a meander line, when surveyed, is intended to lo-
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cate the high water line, then it may be presumed in Im1
to be the high water line. While any party may wish tr,
challenge the meander line as the high water line, anu
proceed to introduce evidence to prove a high water line
at some other elevation or location, that was not done iu
this case. Hardy made no contention for any other line
or elevation either as a high water mark or high water
line, but has argued that the water's edge should be the
boundary. There is no law to support that view, and the
State has invoked the presumption in favor of the surveyed meander line.
c. The Meander Line of the Great Salt Lake
was Surveyed at the Elevation of the Hign
'Vater Line
Captain Stansbury was in charge of the survey
party that surveyed the meander line in 1850. The man·
ual of instructions used by the surveyors directed that
the meander line be located at the high water line, and
the notes of Captain Stansbury clearly show that, despite
considerable difficulty, he did survey the high water
"mark" using the best physical evidence available.
Stansbury's effort might not have been precise in all
respects, but the result of the survey did establish a pre·
cise survey line, and that line (surveyed meander line)
was acepted by the United States Surveyor General as
establishing the correct high water line, and is presumed
in law to be the continuing high water line and thus the
boundary of the bed until someone proves otherwise.
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d. The Surveyed Meander Line Has a Reasonable Basis in Fact as the High \Vater
Line
The water level of the Great Salt Lake at statehood was at the same elevation as it was in the Spring of
1850 when Stansbury made his survey. Consequently, if
Stansbury had surveyed the meander of the lake (at the
high water line) at statehood, he presumably would have
located the meander line at the same elevation as he did
in 1850. Further, if there had been no artificial diversions
from the tributaries to the lake, then the water level at
statehood would have been four feet higher than the
actual level, and Stansbury, had he surveyed such a
higher level at statehood, presumably would have located the meander line about four feet higher than the existing surveyed meander line. This does not suggest that
the State claims ownership above the surveyed meander
line; it simply suggests that the surveyed meander line,
in actual fact, is a very fair boundary indeed to Hardy.
e. The State of Utah has Always Recognized
the Meander Line to be the High Water
Line, and thus the Boundary Line
The State has, since statehood, administered all
lands below the surveyed meander line, and has issued
mineral leases, developed waterfowl areas, etc. The
boundary thus represented by the meander line has been
utilized in vesting many property rights and interests,
and ought not be upset in the absence of compelling reasons to do so.
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f. The .Meander Line is the Only .Feasible
Boundary

It is obvious that a boundary to real prope1·ty should
not radically fluctuate monthly, weekly, and daily, and
this is what would happen on the Great Salt Lake if the
water's edge were the boundary. What would happen
to ownership rights to oil from a producing well located
on exposed land near the water's edge, where the well
site would be water-cove1·ed one week and uncovered the
next-this problem would not exist with a fixed and permanent boundary line, such as that represented by the
surveyed meander line.
g. Summary
In a nutshell, the essential fact is that in 1850 Captain Stansbury surveyed a meander line which he located at the high water line of the lake, and the evidence
is uncontroverted that his survey was the only one ever
made for the purpose of locating such a high water line,
was and is more reliable than any survey that could have
been made at statehood or at any subsequent time, and
the Stansbury survey thus fully established as a matter
of fact that the meander line was the high water line at
the date of survey. A meander line, once surveyed to
establish a high water line, is presumed in law to continue
to be the high water line and thus the true boundary between the state-owned bed and adjoining uplands; and,
while any party may assume the burden of proving by
competent evidence that the forces of nature have located
the high water line at some other elevation, that has not
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happened in this case; therefore, the meander line must
stand as the boundary line.

ARGUMENT
A.

STATE LAW, RATHER THAN .FEDERAL, DETERMINES THE ISSUES IN DISPUTE

The question as to whether federal or state decisional law should be applied to resolve the issues in this
case is not difficult, but it does require some clarification. As will be shown in the following discussion, federal decisional law should apply only to the extent that
it is necessary for this Court to construe the United
States Constitution or a federal statute or treaty.
The logical beginning point is Article III, Section
2, of the United States Constitution, for that is the sole
source of the judicial power conferred upon the United
States by the thirteen original States, and includes:
All cases arising under the constitution, laws and
treaties of the United States;
Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;
Cases involving certain parties, such as ambassadors consuls public ministers; controversies to
States is a party; and controwhidh the
versies between two or more states, between citizens of different States, etc.
The first category mentioned above is the one here
involved, and is the constitutional basis for both "federal
question" jurisdiction and "federal questions" for source
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of law (i.e., requiring the application of federal decisional law). The specific language of Article Ill, Section 2, relating to federal questions is:
The judicial power shall extend to all Cases in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution
the Laws of the United States, and
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority.
Two source of law questions arise in this litigation,
although only one is a matter of contest between the
parties. The uncontested proposition is that federal decisional law controls and must be applied in determining
the navigability of the Great Salt Lake at the date of
Utah's statehood. As explained in point B. 1, infra, state
title to the beds of navigable waters is dependent upon a
federal constitutional concept and the legal effect of the
equal footing clause of the state enabling acts passed by
Congress. As such, both a federal constitutional doctrine
and a federal statute is involved, and whether title passes
from the United States to the State depends on the navigability determination--clearly a matter requiring the
application of federal law.
The contested issue is whether questions of title to
real property (in which there admittedly is no federal
ownership interest) is properly a matter to be resolved
by federal or by state decisional law. Neither party contends that any provision of the federal constitution or
any federal treaty is involved. The question is whether
any federal statute requires construction by this court.
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Hardy owns patented uplands as a successor in interest to a patentee of the United States, and claims that,
since the date of issuance of the patent from the United
States, additional land in the form of relictions have been
exposed by a lowering lake level have attached to Hardy's fee land, and have thus become part of Hardy's fee
title by virtue of federal common law. In essence, Hardy's claim in that, since the United States was the original source of title, federal decisional law as it existed at
the date of patent should be consulted to determine
whether subsequent relictions will be owned by the federal patentee (or his successor in interest).
The State rejects Hardy's argument, and points
out that the entire federal ownership interest has long
since been extinguished, that the patent itself carried no
reliction rights, that Hardy and the State became adjacent owners with a common boundary-and argues
that if the State is to lose part of its land to Hardy under
common law doctrines of real property law, then those
doctrines must be found in Utah law, and not federal
decisional law. Narrowly stated, the question is whether
the mere fact that title to real property originated by
virhie of a patent from the United States is sufficient to
require application of federal decisional law-when there
admittedly is no need for the Court to construe either the
patent or the federal legislation which authorized the
patent.
1. The Property Cases

It seems clearly established in land title disputes
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that federal jurisdiction does not exist simply because a
claimant to title of certain land derived his title or claim
through a patent or grant from the United States uncler
an act of Congress. It has repeatedly been held that a
federal question, whether for source of law or jurisdiction, arises only when a federal statute (or constitutional
provision or treaty) is directly and substantially involved, so that it must be interpreted and construed in
order to resolve the claims in litigation. A question will
be a substantial federal question when, if the statute is
construed in the claimant's favor, he will prevail in his
claim; or when, if the statute is construed against him, he
will fail in his claim.
In Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561 ( 1912},
various parties claimed title to lands under certain laws
of the United States, and in denying federal jurisdiction
for want of a substantial federal question, the court made
the following obsenation:
"A suit to enforce a right which takes its origin in
the laws of the United States is not necessarily, or
for that reason alone, one arising under those
laws, for a suit does not so arise unless it really
and substantiallv invokes a dispute or controversy respecting the validity,
.or ef- .
feet of such a law, upon the determmabon
which the result depends. This is especially so of
a suit invoking rights to land acquired under a
law of the United States. If it were not, every
suit to establish title to land in the central and
''"estern States would so arise, as all titles in those
States are traceable hack to those laws."
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Even when source of title might be dependent upon
the effect of a treaty, there is no federal jurisdiction
based on a substantial federal question unless the construction given the treaty will determine the outcome of
the case. In Romie v. Casanova, 91 U.S. 379 (1875), a
writ of error to the Supreme Court of California was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction where the city of San
.Jose held title to certain land, even though it was not
clear whether such title existed solely by virtue of rights
acquired before the cession of California to the United
States, or whether the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and
federal statutes served to vest or confirm title:
"The title of the city was not questioned, even if it
depended upon the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
and the several acts of Congress to ascertain and
settle private land claims in California, the case
would not be different. Both parties admit that
title, and their litigation extends only to the determination of the rights which they have severally
acquired under it."

A very substantial body of case law follows this
Yiew: Colorndo Central "IJ-lining Co. v. Turck, 150 U.S.
138 ( 1893) ; Florida Central P. Railroad Co. v. Bell,
17() U.S. 321 (1900); Gold-Washing and Water Co. v.
Ke.1Jes, 96 U.S. 199 (1877); Gull.lf v. First National
Bflnk in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109 (1936); McStay v.
Friedman, 92 U.S. 723 ( 1875); and Shoshone Mining
Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505 (1900).
In Blackburn v. Portland Gold Mining Company,
17.5 U.S. 571 (1900), the court reviewed a number of its
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earlier decisions, concluding that there was no federal
question and thus no jurisdiction in a title dispute involving mining locations made under federal statutes,
unless the controversy hinged on the interpretation of
such statutes, and tersely observed:
"This court has frequently been vainly asked to
hold that controversies in respect to lands, one of
the parties to which had derived his title directly
under an act of Congress, for that reason alone
presented a Federal question." (Emphasis added)
2. Constitutional Limitations

It may be that "federal question" considerations involve constitutional limitations on federal power. The
question of constitutional limitations is relevant, interesting, and deserves brief discussion. Following the
adoption of the United States Constitution, the first
judiciary act provided that:

"The laws of the several States, except where the
Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United
States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common
law, in the courts of the United States, in cases
where they apply." Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 28 USC
§725.

Swift v. Ty.r;on, 16 Pet. 1 (1842), involved a question of commercial law where a bill of exchange had been
taken for value, without notice of any defenses to payment, and before maturity; and it was held that federal
commercial and contractual law would apply to determine the rights of the parties. Even under this doctrine,
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however, the court thought it clear that "rights and titles
to real estate" were matters to be determined by local
law. The court concerned itself primarily with congressional intent in the enactment of the judiciary act,
rather than with constitutional grants and limitations,
holding that the act was to be limited:
" ... to state laws strictly local, that is to say to
the positive statutes of the state, and the
tion thereof adopted by the local tribunals, and to
rights and titles to things having a permanent
locality, suoh as the rights and titles to real estate,
and other matters immovable and intraterritorial
in their nature and character." (Emphasis added)
The Swift doctrine received widespread criticism,
White
perhaps reaching its greatest intensity in
Taxicab Co. v. Brown Yellow Taaicab Co., 276 U.S.
518 ( 1928), where Holmes, dissenting and expressing
criticism of the Swift v. Tyson doctrine, said at page
532:

"If I am right the fallacy [of the Swift v. Tyson
holding) has resulted in an unconstitutional assumption of powers by the Courts of the United
States which no lapse of time or respectably array
of opinion should make us hesitate to correct."

The Swift doctrine experienced its demise in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The
facts before the court in Erie required only a determination as to whether federal or state decisional law should
apply in federal courts to assess liability for negligence
in a tort action, in the absence of any state or federal
statute. The court could have limited its decision to those
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facts, eithe1· preserving or gradually eroding the Swift
doctrine. But .Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for the
court, and after reviewing the disservice of Swift in
nearly a century of experience with it, concluded that the
preservation of that doctrine was not a matter of judicial
discretion or statutory construction, but that the entire
doctrine had to be repudiated as a matter of constitutional necessity:
"The injustice and confusion incident to the doctrine of Swift v. 1'yson have been repeatedly
urged as reasons for abolishing or limiting diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. Other legislative
relief has been proposed. If only a question of
statutory construction were involved, we should
not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely
applied throughout nearly a century. But the unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now
been made clear and compels us to do so." (pp. 7778)

The court then went on to explain that:
"Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. And
whether the law of the State shall be declared by
its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court
in a decision is not a matter of federal concern.
There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of
common law applicable in a State whether they
be local in their nature or 'general,' be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no
clause in the Constitution purports to confer such
a power upon the federal courts." ( p. 78)

1,.,
·'-

The statute under review in Erie was not invalidated, merely reconstrued:
"In disapproving that doctrine we do not hold unconstitutional § 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act
of 1789 or any other Act of Congress. We merely
declare that in applying the doctrine, this Com:t
and the lower courts have invaded rights which in
our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to
the several States." (pp. 78-80)

"r

In Erie the court seemed to be persuaded toward its
holding by a law review article published in 1923, ( arren, "New Light on the History of the Federal J udiciary Act of 1789," 37 Harv. Law Rev. 49 [1928]), wherein the early history of Section 34 of the Judiciary Act
was reviewed (including earlier drafts of the statute
prior to its enactment, and other pre-enactment documents) , and where it was concluded by the author that
( 1) the very purpose of the statute was to assure that
the rules of decision as well as the statutes of the states
would apply in federal courts where no federal question
was involved, and ( 2) if the court in Swift had been
aware of the early history of the statute, that doctrine
never would have resulted. The importance placed by the
court on this article is reflected in the following language from the opinion:
"The federal courts assumed, in the broad field of
'o·eneral Inw,' the power to declare rules of decision which Congress was confessedly without
power to enact as statutes. Doubt was repeatedly
expressed as to the correctness of the construction
gfren 34, and as to the soundness of the rule
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which it introduced. But it was the more recent
research of a competent scholar, who examined
the original document, which established that the
construction given to it by the Court was erroneous; and that the purpose of the section was
merely to make certain that, in all matters except
those in which some federal law is controlling, the
federal courts exercising jurisdiction in diversity
of citizenship cases would apply as their rules of
decision the law of the State, unwritten as well as
written." (Erie v. Tompkins, supra, at pp. 72-73)
A number of cases following Erie clearly confirmed
that all lower federal courts in diversity cases were to
apply the law of the respective states (Fidelity Union
Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 [1940); Six Companies
v. Joing Highway District No. 13, 311U.S.180 [1940);
West v. American Tel 8$ Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 [1940);
Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464 [1940);
Vandenbark v. Owens-lllirwis Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538
[1941)), and that the mandate applied to cases in equity
as well as at law (Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S.
99 [1945); Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S.
202 [1938)).
3. The Shoreline Cases
While it is true that the Erie doctrine has been eroded
in some areas of the law, it is now necessary to see whether, or to what extent it survives in reliction cases. Perhaps the earliest case of genuine significance in determining whether state or federal law should control ownership rights of riparians bordering on navigable waters
was Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894). Bowlby had
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received from the State of Oregon a grant of certain
lands situated between the high water mark and low
water mark of the Columbia River. Shively claimed,
through a predecessor in interest, under a prior patent
issued by the United States while Oregon was still a
Territory, asserting ownership "of all the tide lands and
riparian rights and wharfing rights in front of block 4
to the channel. ..."
Thus, Bowlby claimed pursuant to a subsequent
state grant and Shively claimed pursuant to a prior federal grant, claiming that the subsequent state grant
could not cut off his riparian rights to tidelands and
wharfing in the river. The question as to whether a subsequent state grant could limit or eliminate riparian
rights claimed under a federal patent was squarely before the court. The Oregon Supreme Court held that it
could. The United States Supreme Court agreed, and
in affirming the decree, observed that there had been
such:
"a diversity of view as to the scope and effect of
the previous decisions of this court upon the subject of public and private rights in lands below
high water mark of navigable waters, that this
appears to the court to be a fit
for .a full
review of those decisions and a consideration of
other authorities upon the subject." (pages 1011)

In doing so, the Court reviewed at length the early
common law of England, and then turned to the various
adaptations those common law principles had received
by the thirteen original states, observing:
35

"The gm·ernments of the several Colonies, with a
view to induce persons to erect wharves for the
benefit of navigation and commerce, early allowed to the owners of lands bounding on tide waters
greater rights and privileges in the shore below
high water mark, than they had in England. llut
the nature and degree of such rights and privileges differed in the different Colonies, and in
some were created by statute, while in others they
rested upon usage only" (p. 18)
The court reviewed at some length the law of each
of the thirteen original states (Massachusetts, p. 18;
New Hampshire, p. 20; Rhode Island, p. 20; Connecticut, p. 20; New York, p. 20; New Jersey, p. 21; Pennsylvania, p. 23; Delaware, p. 23; .Maryland, p. 23; Virginia, p. 24; North Carolina, p. 25; South Carolina, p.
::25; Georgia, p. 25). ].Host of the original thirteen states
limited, or actually denied, ownership rights of riparians
below high water mark.
Having thus ernluated and emphasized the differences in the law of the various states, the court cautioned:
"The foregoing summary of the laws of the original States shows that there is no universal and
uniform law upon the subject; but that each State
has dealt with the lands under the tide waters
within its borders according to its own views of
justice and policy, reserving its own control over
such lands, or granting rights therein to individuals or corporations, whether owners of the adjoining upland or not, as it considered for the best
interests of the public. Great caution, therefore,
is necessary in applying precedents in one State
to cases arising in another." ( p. 26)
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The court then devoted some twenty-five pages to
a discussion of all of the earlier relevant decisions by the
United States Supreme Court, pointing out that in each
instance the court, where possible, ascertained and applied the law of the state involved (pp. 26-51). The
court, in affirming the Oregon Supreme Court, concluded:
"By the law of the State of Oregon, therefore, as
enacted by its legislature and declared by its highest court, the title in the lands in controversy is in
the defendants in error; and, upon the principles
recognized and affirmed by a uniform series of
recent decisions of this court, above referred to,
the law of Oregon governs the case." (p. 57)
It should be noted that in Shively v. Bowlby the
rnnrt found a federal question for jurisdiction only by
Yirtue of the fact that the controversy required the construction of the effect and extent of an official grant by
the United States. The court concluded that the federal
grant gave the grantee no rights below high water mark.
Then, fifteen years later, in McGilvra v. Ross, 215
lJ. S. 7 O ( 1909) , certain private parties claimed riparian
rights under federal patents to Lake Union and Lake
\Vashington in the State of Washington. They asserted
federal question jurisdiction, contending that it would
be necessary to construe the effect of federal patents,
and further claimed that the State of Washington was
laking their riparian rights without due process of law in
dolation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
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Constitution. The court passed over the latter contention, pointing out that:
"if the appellants did not derive the rights contended for by the patents, they have no rights to
be impaired, even asuming, as we have assumed
in this discussion, that the action of the State has
proceeded far enough to be a trespass upon or an
impairment of them."
With respect to the claim of a federal question, i.e.,
that it would be necessary to contrue the meaning and
effect of a federal patent, the court pointed out that such
would be true only "if prior decisions have not defined
such rights and removed them from controversy." The
court summarized the holding in the Shively v. Bowlby
decision, and concluded that there no longer was a federal question because:
"The issue was accurately presented Gn Shively]
between a title under a patent of the United
States and one conveyed by a State in the exercise
of its dominion over lands below high-water mark.
The issue in the case at bar is exactly the same."
(p. 77)
The court then considered the contention by the
riparian patentees that the Shively case involved navig- .
able waters affected by the tides, whereas Lakes Union
and'¥ashington were navigable waters not affected by
the tides, and concluded that non-tidal navigable waters
fell within the same category as tidal navigable waters,
and that the State of Washington had "full jurisdiction ·
over the lands within its borders, including the beds of
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streams and other waters" (p. 79) . This being so, there
was no "federal question" to be decided in construing
the patents. The patents carried no riparian rights by
their own force, and any such rights could only be created or recognized under the law of the State of Washington. Thus, concluded the court:
"It follows from these views that the Circuit
Court of Appeals rightly decided that the questions presented by the bill are no longer open to
discussion, and that the Circuit Court was without jurisdiction." ( p. 80)

There were a considerable number of decisions by
the United States Supreme Court between McGilvra v.
Ross in 1909 and Hughes v. State of Washington, 398
U.S. 290 (1967), but they all were consistent with the
Bowlby and McGilvra holdings that state, not federal,
law controls as to the ownership, use and disposition of
all riparian lands not included within the express terms
of federal grants or patents.
It is necessary at this point to examine the manner
in which Borax v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. IO
( 1935 ) , was misinterpreted by a lower court, and how
that misinterpretation laid the foundation for the decision by the United States Supreme Court in Hughes
v. W Mhington (that federal law applies to determine
conflicting claims of ownership between a state and riparian claimants to lands situated between navigable
waters and the line or ordinary high tide at statehood,
when the international seas are involved).
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In United States v. Washington, 294 F.2d 830
(Ninth Circ. 1961), the dispute was over title to accretions that had formed since the date of statehood. The
United States still held title to the upland (subject to a
certain Indian trust that is not material to the present
issue), and the question was whether the accretions attached to the upland owned by the United States, or
whether they belonged to the State of 'Vashington as
part of the "bed" of the Pacific Ocean. Under Washington law, the title of the state became fixed, definite, and
permanent at the date of statehood, and the accretions
had simply formed along an area that had been a part
of the bed at statehood; under federal decisional law,
patterned after the common law, it was thought that the
accretions would become part of the estate of the upland
owner. The issue of ownership, between the State of
'V ashington and the United States, would therefore
depend on whether state or federal common law applied.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that federal common law applied and that the accretions were
owned by the United States, relying primarily upon the
Borax case and citing the following language from
Borax:
The question as to the extent of this federal grant,
that is, as to the limit of the land conveyed, or the
boundary between the upland and the tideland, is
necessarily a federal question. It is a question
which concerns the validity and effect of an act
done by the United States; it involves the ascertainment of the essential basis of a right asserted
under federal law. [Citations omitted] Rights and
-10

in
tideland, which is subject to tht.
sovereignty of the State, are matters of local law.
[Citations omitted}
The court in United States v. Washington noted
that the question of accretions was not involved in
Boraiv, but suggested that the same principle was inrnlYed, because if the upland owner should be entitled
to the imperceptible accretions, it would be an attribute
of title obtained by grant from the Government:
"Thus the determination of the attributes of an
underlying federal title, quite as much as the determination of the boundaries of the land reserved
or acquired under such a tile, 'involves the ascertainment of the essential basis of a right asserted
under federal law." (p. 832)
The language of the Circuit Court ignored the specific holding of McGilvra v. Ross, which said that there
was no federal question, and thus no federal jurisdiction,
when the dispute concerned lands situated below the
mean high water mark at statehood, because those questions were to be determined by state law. Further and
more importantly, the Boraa: case did not hold, or even
suggest, that such questions were to be determined by
federal law, but simply held that there was a federal
question to determine whether a federal patent was
rnlid when it purported to convey state lands situated
below the line of ordinary high tide. Since all lands below ordinary high tide were owned by the state, the federal patent was void as to such lands, and they were subject to whatever ownership, control or disposition that
-ll

might be provided for by the laws of the state. The merits
of the claims to the lands below the line of high tide were,
on remand, decided by the state decisional law of California ( 102 F2d 52 [9th Circ. 1939}).
Returning to the Court of Appeals decision in
United States v. Washington, the court found no further support beyond Borax for its decision to apply federal law to determine ownership of the accretions (although the court did suggest in notes to the decision that
other decisions of the United States Supreme Court "indicated" or "implicitly" recognized that such was the
correct course of action. This characterization is not sustained by the citations contained in the notes) .
The Borax case is entirely consistent with the earlier pronouncements of the United States Supreme
Court. It simply held that a United States patent did
not, and could not, convey any lands lying below ordinary high tide or mean high water mark, even though it
purported to do so. But this decision was misapplied by
the Court of Appeals in United States v. Washington
to support the notion that the existence of a federal patent required the application of federal law (the Court of
Appeals even cited Shively v. Bowlby as authority for
the proposition that federal law recognized accretions to
be the property of the upland owner, when Shively
clearly held that such questions were matters of state
law).
The preceding discussion of Borax v. Los Angeles
and United States v. Washington is not of critical im42

portance to the instant appeal, but it is useful to show
exactly where the United States Supreme Court now
stands, and how it got there, as presently revealed by
Hughes v. Washington. In the latter case, the Court
held that federal common law must be applied in a controversy between the State of Washington and one of its
citizens over the right to accretions on the beach of the
Pacific Ocean. The Court justified its holding by citing
the Ninth Circuit Court's mistaken view of Borax. If the
shorelands of the Great Salt Lake were ocean beaches,
the Hughes decision would be a difficult hurdle indeed
for the State of Utah.
Fortunately, that is not necessary, for the Supreme
Court found a feaeral question only because the ocean
waters lapping the Washington beach were the same
waters that formed the national boundary of the United
States. Tenuous as that touchstone may be, it was the
one seized upon by the Court to apply federal decisional
law in Hughes. There is no ocean beach, no high seas,
and no national boundary involved on the Great Salt
Lake. If, at some future time, some rationale is devised
to find a federal question in title disputes to land around
inland, intrastate bodies of water, that effort ought not
be supplied by the Utah Supreme Court. At present,
there is absolutely no judicial precedent, in any state or
federal jurisdiction, for applying federal decisional law
in a case such as the one at bar. Hughes comes the closest, but it does not come far enough, and it represents a
radical departure from a long line of earlier pronouncements by the United States Supreme Court.
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4. Cases Cited by Hardy

There remains now the matter of discussing the six
cases cited by Hardy in the section of its brief devoted
to the source of law argument (at pages 22-26). These
cases can be summarily treated in the following manner:
a. The first case cited by Hardy is Producers Oil
Compan,IJ v. Hansen, 238 U.S. 325 (1915). This case is
not relevant at all, since it talks about accretions existing at the date of patent. Thus, at the date of patent, if
the accretions were the property of the United States,
the question is whether the patent did or did not conrer
such federally owned land. This is a federal question requiring the construction of a federal patent, since it must
be determined whether the patent, of its own force and
effect, operated to convey such land. On the other hand,
it is quite a different question to determine ownership of
accretions or relictions formed after the date of patent,
as in the case at bar. In such a case one does not construe
the patent to determine ownership, but looks to principles of law applicable to such subsequent events. Thus, ·
the official U.S. Government publication for surveying
lands (.Manual of Instruction for the Survey of the
Public Lands of the United States, Exhibit P-HH),
declares at page 370:
If the original subdidsions were disposed of prior
to the formation of the accretion, or if the accretions that are formed along navigable waters are
reserved bv State law the Government has no
jurisdictio;..
'

The U. S. Supreme Court, in Wilcoa: v. Jackson, 38
C.S. 498, 517 (1839) had earlier confirmed the principle:
"'Ve hold the true principle to be this, that whenever the question in any Court, state or federal, is,
whether a title to land which had once been the
of the United States has passed, that
question must be resolved by the laws of the
United States; but that whenever, acc()rding to
those laws, the title shall have passed, then that
property, like all other property in the state, is
subject to the state legislation; so far as that legislation is consistent with the admission that the
title passed and vested according to the laws of
the United States." (Emphasis added)
This distinction is not a difficult one, but it is a fundamental one. In fact, Hardy, in the lower court, intro(luced the decision of the Interior Department concerning the Great Salt Lake exposed lands (Exhibit D-Z),
explaining that Hardy adopted the position therein expressed on source of law ( T. 80). But that Interior Department opinion expressly recognized that the U. S.
Supreme Court has held, in cases such as the one at bar,
that state law applies. In St. Louis v. Rutz, 138 U.S.
2211 ( 1891), the Supreme Court had held that title to
alluvial additions to land in private ownership, forming
ofter the date of the patent from the United States, were
controlled by state law. The Interior Department deeision (Hardy's own exhibit) commenting on the St.
Lnuis v. Rutz decision, said (at page 10):
In such a situation, that State law governs title
to the accretions cannot be questioned.

b. The second case cited by Hardy is M cGilvra v
Ross, 215 U.S. 70 ( 1909). This case is badly miscited
by Hardy, because the quoted portion seems to sugges1
that there is a federal question, when in fact the Cour1
held there was no federal question and dismissed the case
for lack of federal question jurisdiction.
c. The third case cited by Hardy is United States
v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935) (in fact, Hardy cites this
case a number of times, at pages 21, 22, 28, 29, 35, and 3!1
of its brief) . Hardy can get no mileage out of this case,
since it dealt with non-navigable waters. The principles
applicable to non-navigable waters have nothing to do
with the issues in the case at bar. With respect to non.
navigable waters, title does not pass to the state at statehood, but is retained by the United States, and, when
subsequent patents are issued, title to the bed of such
waters may or may not pass to the grantees, depending
on the meaning and construction given to the patents.
Hardin v. Shed, 190 U.S. 508, 519 (1903); Hardin v.
Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1891); Mitchel v. Smale, 140
U.S. 406, 413 (1891).
But that has nothing to do with the present appeal.
The language quoted by Hardy from U.S. v. Oregon
had this gackground. The lake in question was a small.
meandered, non-navigable lake. The United States had
issued patents to the uplands bordering on the meander
line, but had, by Executive Order, reserved the area
within the meander line as a bird reserve. Oregon enacted a statute, declaring state ownership of all mean·
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dered lakes, whether navigable or not. The Supreme
Court said that Oregon could not decide or determine by
its local state statute the effect of the federal patents
and the federal Executive Order, since title to the bed of
the non-navigable lake did not pass to Oregon at statehood, but remained federal land, and:
"The laws of the United States alone control the
disposition of title to its lands. The States are
powerless to place any limitation or restriction on
that control." (295 U.S. 1, 27 (1935))
True. But here we are talking about a navigable
body of water, title to which passed to the State of Utah
at statehood. We are not talking about controlling the
disposition of federal lands, but about controlling the
disposition of state lands. Thus, since these lands passed
into state ownership, and since Hardy now seeks to apply principles of law to "control the disposition" or ownership of those lands, why cannot it be said, with equal
logic, merit, and justification, that:
The laws of the State of Utah alone control the
disposition of title to its lands.
In point of fact, U.S. v. Oregon, while of no help to
Hardy, is a persuasive opinion which, by analogy, fully
supports the position of the State in this litigation.
d. The fourth case cited by Hardy at page 23 of its
brief is Borax Consolidated Limited v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935). The quoted extracts are misleading and contrary to the holding of the case. The
Court simply said that the validity of the patent was a
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federal question, and held that it was invalid to the extent
that it actually described and purported to convey a part
of the state-owned bed. As to such lands, located below
the line of ordinary high tide, the Court said: "Rights
and interest in the tideland, which is subject to the sovereignty of "the State, are matters of local law." Accordingly, a portion of the federal patent was invalidated,
and the cotroversy was remanded for trial in the district
where the local state law of estoppel controlled (20 :F'.
Supp. 69 [S.D. Cal. 1937]); the decision was affirmed
on appeal ( 102 F2d 52 [9th Circ. 1939]) ; and the United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari (307 U.S. 64-l!
(1939]).
e. The fifth and sixth cases cited by Hardy, at pages
24-25 of its brief, are United States v. W a.Yhington, 294
F2d 830 (9th Circ. 1961) and Hughes v. State of Washington, 389 U.S. 290 ( 1967). These two cases have been
discussed above, where it is pointed out that the Circuit
Court opinion offers no more than a mistaken view of
Borax, and the Supreme Court in Hughes found the
ocean and the international sea to be tied closely enough
to the national boundary to make beach accretions a
federal question:
"'Ve hold that this question is governed by f ederal, not state, law and that under federal law Mrs.
Hughes, who traces her title to a federal grant
prior to statehood, is the owner of these accretions." (Page 291)
"The rule deals with waters that lap both the
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lands of the State and the boundaries of the intersea. This relationship, at this particular
pomt of the marginal sea, is too close to the vital
interest of the Nation in its own boundarfies to
allow it to be governed by any law but the "supreme Law of the Land." (Page 293)
Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring in the result for
reasons of' constitutional due process, was unwilling to
endorse federal law for the purpose of resolving land
title questions:
"Surely it must be conceded as a general proposition that the law of' real property is, under our
Constitution, left to the individual States to develop and administer. And surely \Vashington or
any other State is free to make changes, either
legislative or judicial, in its general rules of real
property law, including the rules governing the
property rights of riparian owners. Nor are riparian owners who derive their title from the
United States somehow immune from the changing impact of' these rules. [Citation omitted} For
if' they were, then the property law of a State like
ashington, carYed entirely out of federal territory, would be forever frozen into the mold it
occupied on the date of the State's admission to
the Union. It follows that Mrs. Hughes cannot
claim immunity from changes in the property law
of'
ashington simply because her title derives
from a federal grant." (Page 295)

"r
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Thus, Mr. Justice Stewart accurately summarized
the earlier holdings of the United States Supreme
Court, but the majority opinion found a "federal" question in the "boundaries of the international sea" that
were "close to the vital interest of the Nation in its own
-19

boundaries ...."The Great Salt Lake is not an international sea, and it really doesn't seem to be critically connected with national boundaries.
Hardy has failed to mention what it thinks the federal question is in this case.
5. Federal Statutes on Source of Law

In light of that part of the foregoing discussion in
this section relating to constitutional limitations on federal decisions as a source of law, there is some question
as to the extent to which Congress would have any constitutional say about whether federal law should apply.
But assuming, for the sake of argument, that it could,
then it is interesting to note that Congress has declared
that state law should apply in cases such as the one at bar.
It has already been shown that the original judiciary act provided that state law should apply except
where the federal constitution, treaties or statutes required construction:

"The laws of the several States, except where the
Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United
States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common
law, in the courts of the United States, in cases
where they apply." (Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 28
USC§ 725)
It has also been shown above that Swift v. Tyson
mistakenly interpreted this statute as limited essentially
to state statutory law, except as to "rights and titles to
things having a permanent locality, such as the rights
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and titles to real estate, ..." But Erie v. Tomkins said
that such a limitation was erroneous, because federal decisional law could apply only when a federal question
under the federal constitution or a federal treaty or
statute was involved, and that in all other matters state
law had to apply:
"Congress has no power to declare substantive
rules of common law applicable in a State, whether they be local in their nature or "general," be
they commercial law or a part of the law of torts.
And no clause in the Constitution purports to
confer such a power upon the federal courts."
( 304 U. S. 64, 78 [1938)).

And that:
" ... in applying the [Swift v. Tyson] doctrine,
this Court and the lower courts have invaded
rights which in our opinion are reserved by the
Constitution to the several States." (304 U.S. 64,

79-80 (1938)).

The above review of the original judiciary act,
Swift v. Tyson and Erie v. Tompkins might seem to
duplicate part of the earlier discussion about constitutional limitations on source of law, and, to an extent it
does, but is swnmarized here to set the background for
quite a different question, i.e., the Congressional declaration as to source of law.
Ten years after the Erie decision, Congress passed
the Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 944, 28 USC 1652, restated the essence of the Section 24 of the original ju51

diciary act, and fully concurred in the Erie declaration
that local law should apply:
The laws of the several states, except where the
Constitution or treaties of the United States or
Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide,
shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in all
cases where they apply.
Perhaps of equal importance with the above statute,
and of more specific application to the case at bar, is the
Submerged Lands Act, where congress confirmed in the
states all title to the beds of navigable waters and the natural resources therein, declaring that all ownership
rights would be determined by the law of the respective
states. Thus, Section 1311 (a) of the Act of May 22,
1953 ( 67 Stat. 30, J.3 U.S.C. 1311) specifically provides
that:
It is determined and declared to be in the public
interest that ( 1) title to and ownership of the
lands beneath navigable waters wthin the boundaries of the respective States, and the natural resources within such lands and waters, and ( 2) the
right and power to manage, administer, lease, develop, and use the said lands and natural resources all in arcordance with applicabl c State
law be, and they are, subject to the provisions
hereof, recognized, confirmed, established, and
yested in and assigned to the respective States or
the persons who were on June .5, 1950, entitled
thereto under the law of the respective States in
which the land is located, and the respectiw
O'rantees lessees or successors in interest thereof;
I'">
'
'
(Emphasis added)
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The annotations of judicial decisions under the two
slatutes just cited, as found in the United States Code
Annotated (28 USCA 1652 and 43 USCA 1311), show
that state law, rather than federal, has been uniformly
and consistently applied to all matters of real property
ownership, including lands beneath and adjacent to navigable waters.
H.

UTAH RECEIVED TI'l'LE TO THE BED
OF THE GREAT SALT LAKE ON JANUARY 4<, 1896, 'VHEN UTAH BECAME A
STATE
1. Navigability as a Basis of State Title

lJ tah' s claim of title to the bed of Great Salt Lake
is based on the equal footing doctrine, which, so far as
applicable here, holds that the United States Constitution gaurantees to each state, upon its admission to the
union and pursuant to its enabling act, equal sovereign
rights and equal footing with every other state in the
union, including ownership of the beds of all navigable
lakes and rivers located within such state.

In other words, the test of navigability for purposes
of Yesting title in the states to navigable lakes and
streams is a constitutional concept developed and designed for the purpose of according to every state equal
footing with all of the other states admitted into the
Union. The thirteen original states held title in both a
soYereign and proprietary capacity to the beds of navigable lakes and rivers, and they retained that title when
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they formed the federal Union, and all other states since
admitted into the Union have been entitled to the same
sovereign and proprietary rights in beds of navigable
lakes and streams as the original thirteen states. Martin
v. Wadell,41 U.S. (16Pet.) 367 (1842);Pollardv.
Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845); Shively v. Bow/.
by, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); United States v. Holt State
Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926); and United States v. Utah,
283U.S.64 (1931).
The State recognizes that the question of navigabil·
ity, when asserted as the basis of a right arising under
the Constitution of the United States, is necessarily a
question of federal law to be determined according to
the general rule recognized and applied in federal courts.
United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55-56
( 1926); Brewer-Elliott Oil and Gas Co. v. United
States, 260 U.S. 77, 87 (1922); United States v. Utah,
283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931).
The federal test of navigability, for the purpose of
determining whether a state obtained title to the bed of
a body of water at statehood, is whether the river or lake
in its natural and ordinary condition was physically cap·
able of supporting commercial navigation, and thus serv·
ing as a useful highway of commerce. This test was fully
clarified by the United States Supreme Court in 1879.
and has been followed consistently in all subsequent
cases.
Perhaps the leading case applying the federal test
of navigability is United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. M
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( 1931), which involved a determination of the naviO'o

ability of certain portions of the Colorado, Green and
San Juan Rivers in Utah, where the sections of the rivers
in question contained many impediments to navigation
and were only about three feet deep during major portions of the year. Counsel for the United States stressed
the absence of historical data showing the early navigation of the rivers by Indians, fur traders or early explorers as evidence that the rivers were not navigable.
The Court laid to rest the Government's attempt to
read into the navigability test a requirement of actual
navigation, and at the same time reaffirmed the principles laid down by several earlier cases, with the following language (at page 82-83) :
"The question of the susceptibility (to use as
highways of commerce) in the ordinary condition
of the rivers, rather than the mere manner or extent of such use, is the crucial question. The Government insists that the uses of the rivers have
been more of a private nature than of a public,
commercial sort. But, assuming this to be the fact,
it cannot be regarded as controlling when the
rivers are shown to be capable of commercial use.
The extent of actual use of streams, and especially
of extensive and continued use for commercial
persuasive, but
conpurposes, may be
ditions of exploration and settlement explam the
infrequency or limited nature of such use, the susceptibility to use as a highway of commerce may
still be satisfactorily proved . . . In Economy
Power Light Co. v. U.S., 256 U.S. 113, 122,
123, the' Court quoted with approval, the
ment in the Montello, supra, that the capab1hty
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of use by the public for purposes of transportation
and commerce affords the true criterion of the
navigability of a river, rather than the extent and
manner of such use.' "
The Government further attempted to dispute navigability of the rivers by establishing that they contained
impediments to navigation such as logs and debris, ice,
floods, rapids, velocities with sudden changes in the
water level, shallow depths, instability of channel, and
sand and sediment which combined with the tortuous
course of the rivers to produce a succession of shifting
sandbars. The Court conceded the presence of all of
these impediments and entered into an extensive discussion (at pages 8.5-87) of the evidence regarding types
and frequencies of the sandbars, which it felt to be the
principle impediment to navigation. Nevertheless, the
Court held that the fact of impediments was not equivalent to the fact of non-navigable capacity (at page 86) :
"Recognizing the difficulties which are thus
created, the Master is plainly right in his conclusion the mere fact of the presence of such sandbars causing impediments to navigation does not
make a river non-navigable. It is sufficient to
refer to the well-known conditions on the Missouri
River and the Mississippi River. The presence of
sandbars must be taken in connection with other
factors making for navigability. In The Montello,
supra, the Court said ( p. 443) : Indeed, there are
but few of our ... rivers which <lid not
present serious obstructions to an uninterrupted
navigation. In some cases like the Fox River,
they may be so great while they last as to
the use of the best instrumentalities for carrymg
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on commerce, but the vital and essential point is
whether the natural navigation of the river is such
that it affords a channel for useful commerce. If
!his be. so
river is navigable in fact, although
nangahon may be encompassed with difficulties by reason of natural barriers such as rapids
and sandbars."
The test of navigability thus applied in United
States 'L'. Utah, supra, was simply a re-affirmation of
the same principles earlier set forth by the Court in The
Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 'Vall.) 557, 563-64 (1870),
where the Court, after noting that the doctrine of the
common law as to the navigability of waters (i.e., that
the ebb and flow of the tide constituted the usual test of
navigability) had no application in this country, stated:
"A different test must, therefore, be applied to
determine the navigability of our rivers, and that
is found in their navigable capacity. Those rivers
must be regarded as public navigable rivers in
law which are navigable in fact. And they are
navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition,
as highways for commerce, over which trade and
travel are or may be conducted in the customary
modes of trade and travel on water ...

From the conceded facts ... the (Grand River)
is capable of bearing a steamer of one hundred
and twenty three tons burden, laden with merchandise and passengers ... a distance of forty
miles."
Since the appellant had conceded that the stream was
rapable of bearing a steamer of one hundred and twentythree tons burden for a distance of forty miles, laden
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with merchandise and passengers, the Court reached the
obvious conclusion that the Grand River did have a capacity to bear commercial navigation.
The navigability test laid down by 'Phe Daniel Ball
was subsequently relied upon by the Supreme Court in
The Montello, 20 'Vall. 430 (1874), where the Court
there applied the test to the Fox River in Wisconsin, a
stream which in its natural state was interrupted in various places by rapids and falls, and yet determined it to
be navigable, stating (at page 441) :
" ( T) he true test of the navigability of a stream
does not depend on the mode by which commerce
is, or may be, conducted nor the difficulties attending the navigation ...
It would be a narrow rule to hold that ... unless
a river was capable of being navigated by steam or
sail vessels it could not be treated as a public
highway. The capability of use by the public for
purposes of transportation and commerce affords
the true criterion of the navigabality of a river,
rather than the extent and manner of that use. If
it be capable in its natural state of being used for
purposes of commerce, no matter in what mode
the commerce may be conducted, it is navigable
in fact ..."
This test of navigability thus established by The
Daniel Ball and followed by The Montello, that a body
of water is navigable in law if it is navigable in fact, has
been subsequently followed and reaffirmed without any
significant modification on numerous occasions, and a
persuasive line of reasoning and authority has been de-
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veloped. See, e.g., United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 699 (1898); United States v.
Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 323-24 (1917); Economy Light
and Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113, 118
(1921); and Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 586
(1921).

United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49
(1926) , was the first significant case to apply the test of
navigability to a lake, and involved a bill in equity
brought by the United States to quiet title to the bed of
Mud Lake in Minnesota, which had been drained and
was dry at the time of suit. Since it was a land title suit,
the outcome of the case turned on the navigability of
Mud Lake. The test applied by the Court was the one
evolved from the earlier line of cases cited above, and
explained by the Court as follows, (at page 56) :
"The rule long since approved by this court in
applying the Constitution and laws of the United
States is that streams or lakes which are navigable
in fact must be regarded as navigable in law; that
they are navigable in fact when they are used, or
are susceptible of being used, in their natural and
ordinary condition as highways for commerce,
over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customy modes of trade and travel
on water; and further, that navigability does not
depend on the particular mode in which
is or may be had-whether by steamboats, sailmg
vessels or flatboats-nor on an absence of occasional difficulties in navigation, but on the fact,
if it be a fact, that the stream in its natural and
ordinary condition affords a channel for useful
commerce."
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This test 'ms applied to evidence which the Court
found to establish the following facts:
"In its natural and ordinary condition the lake
was three to six feet deep ... Early visitors and
settlers in that vicinity used the river and lake as
a route of travel, employing the small boats of
the period for the purpose .... Merchants in the
settlements at Liner and Grygla, which were several miles up Mud River from the lake, used the ,
river and lake in sending for and bringing in their
supplies. True, the navigation was limited, but
this was because trade and travel in that vicinity
were limited. In seasons of great drought
was difficulty in getting boats up the river and
through the lake, but this was exceptional, the ·
usual conditions being as just stated. Sand bars
in some parts of the lake prevented boats from
moving readily all over it, but the bars could be
avoided by keeping the boats in the deeper parts
or channels ... Gasoline motor boats were used in
surveying and marking the line of the intended
ditch through the lake and the ditch was excavated with floating dredges."
The Court concluded that the evidence required a
finding that :Mud Lake was navigable, pointing out that
the lake was susceptible of being used as a highway for
trade and travel if there had been a need for trade and'
travel on the lake.
It will thus be observed that at all times during the
last century the United States Supreme Court has consistently applied the same test of navigability that was
adhered to and emphasized in United States 'l'. Utah.
supra, which is the most recent case of significance on the
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subject, and where the Court found water three feet deep
ufficient to support navigation (only about 103 as
deep as the 30 foot depth of the Great Salt Lake).
The Utah Supreme Court, applying the federal
test of navigability, has on two occasions taken judicial
notice that the Great Salt Lake is navigable. In Robinson v. 1'homas, 75 Utah 446, 286 Pac. 625 (1930) the
Court said:
" ... It is not alleged in the Complaint, nor was
evidence given to show, that Great Salt Lake was
a navigable body of water. 'Ve, however, take
judicial notice that the lake is about eighty miles
long and from twenty to forty miles wide and is
navigable or susceptible of navigation...."

Accord: Deseret Livestock Co. v. State, 110 Utah 239,
171 P.2d 401 (1946).

The United States Supreme Court has indicated
that judicial notice may be taken of the navigability of
waters when the navigable capacity is general knowledge. For example, in United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Compan.lJ, 174 U.S. 690, 697 (1899), the Court
said:
"In Wood v. Fowler, 26 Kansas, 682-687, the
Supreme Court of that state said: 'Indeed, it
would seem absurd to require evidence as to that
which every man of common information must
know. To attempt to prove that the Mississippi or
the Missouri is a navigable stream would seem an
insult to the intelligence of the court. The presumption of general knowledge weakens as we
pass to smaller and less known streams; and yet,

..
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within the limits of any State the navigability of
its largest rivers ought to be generally known,
and the courts may properly assume it to be a
matter of general knowledge and take judicial
notice thereof.'

"It is reasonable that the courts take judicial
notice that certain rivers are navigable and others
not, for these are matters of general knowledge."
As shown above, the Utah Supreme Court has on
two occasions taken judicial notice of the navigability of
the Great Salt Lake-applying the federal standard in
doing so! That course of action was clearly proper in
view of the obvious physical capacity of the lake and in
accordance with the suggestion of the United States Supreme Court that within the limits of any state the navigability of the larger bodies of water "ought to be generally known, and the courts may properly assume it tu
be a matter of general knowledge and take judicial no·
tice thereof." (United States v. Rio Grande IrrigatiOtl
Company, 174 U.S. 690, 697 (1899) [citing with ap
proval Wood v. Fowler, 26 Kansas 682-87)).
But in the present litigation Hardy denied the nai·
igability of the Great Salt Lake, and the State eithe1
had to assume the burden of prima facie proof of navig
ability or to rely on the earlier decisions taking judicial
notice of navigability. Since the navigability of the lak1
had not been challenged previously and navigability hui
never been adjudicated on evidence introduced, the Stati
took both courses of action, relying initially on judicia
notice but also proceeding to introduce evidence of spe
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cific physical facts showing navigable capacity at the
date of statehood-to end any speculation that the lake
on January 4, 1896 might not have had a navigable capacity.
2. Facts Showing Navigable Capacity

The State recognizes that for the purpose of determining title to the beds of lakes and streams the determination of navigability is limited to the date of statehood.
The condition of the body of water at any other time is
irrelevant. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1. 18, 26 (1894);
United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931); Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 591, 594 {1922).
The record contains reliable and accurate information with respect to the physical characteristics of the
Great Salt Lake on January 4, 1896. Various exhibits
introduced into evidence actually show with precision
and clarity the exact depth, width, length and perimeter
of the lake at statehood-including the contour depths
of the water covered bed of the lake. This evidence is not
controverted or disputed.
The water level of the lake at statehood is determined from a hydrograph kept by the Water Resources
Division of the United States Geological Survey (Exhibit P-T, Tr. 68). This hydrograph is part of the official records of U.S.G.S. and is based on gage readings
of the level of the lake from 1850 to the present time.
Gage readings are taken twice each month and recorded
on the hydrograph to show the elevation of the surface
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of the lake in feet above mean sea level. Thus, the level
of the lake at any particular time during the past l:W
years can readily be determined from the hydrograph.
The actual depth of the lake in any particular place
at any particular time is determined by using the hydrograph in conjunction with established contour depths.
The surface contour lines and the contour depths (Exhibits P-D-A, P-D-B, P-D-C, P-D-D) have been established by the University of Utah and the Utah Mineralogical and Geological Survey, working in conjunction
with the United States Geological Survey. The techniques used have included photo-mapping, actual depth
probes and fathometer depth readings taken from the
surface of the lake (Exhibit P-D-E 1, 2). In other
words, contour lines have been established to show the
contour and the elevation of all parts of the bed of the
lake as well as the uplands surrounding the lake. Thus
if a person desired to determine the depth of a particular
area of the lake at any particular time he would first
examine the subsurface contours of the lake and determine the mean elevation above sea level of the bed in the
area of interest-say 4170 feet. He would then turn to
the hydrograph to ascertain the surface elevation at the
time in question. He would find, for example, that an
area of the lake where the bed had an elevation of 4170
feet would have had a depth of 31 feet in 1850, 41.5 feet
in 1872 (the lake's highest recorded level), 31 feet in
1896, 35 feet in 1924, 21.5 feet in 1963 (the lake's lowest
recorded level), and 26 feet in 1969.
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Similarly, it is easy to reconstruct the perimeter or
surface area of the lake at any time during the 120 years
last past, or to project the surface area for any assumed
elevation of the surface of the lake in the future. This
can be done by simply determining the elevation of the
water at a particular date as shown on the hydrograph
and then plotting the perimeter with respect to the contour line at or nearest to that particular elevation.
The above explanation is simply for the purpose of
showing that a remarkably reliable body of information
is available with respect to the actual physical characteristics of the Great Salt Lake on the critical date-January J, 1896. On that very day the lake was 77 miles
long, 32.5 miles wide, and 30 feet deep. The areas of the
lake which had a depth of 30 feet or more were not narro-w channels, but were several miles wide and extended
substantially throughout the length of the lake. None of
this evidence is in dispute. (See, generally, Exhibits PP-D-C, P-D-D and P-D-E-1, 2).
Evidence of actual use of the lake for navigation is
unnecessary, since the test is whether the lake had a
physical capacity to support navigation, and not whether
it was actually navigated. Nevertheless, evidence of actual use is relevant to illustrate or demonstrate navigable
capacity. In other words, a body of water may be navig11 ble though not actually navigated; but if it is successfuly navigated, then there is conclusive proof that it has
a navigable capacity. Evidence introduced into the record, completely uncontroverted, demonstrated substan65

tial navigation of many types. This included large steamboats used for the purpose of hauling livestock and ore,
as well as passengers (Exhibits P-G-1, P-H-1, P-I,
P-J); the use of large boats by the Southern Pacific
Company to construct the Lucin Cut-off Trestle (P-K1, P-L-1); the successful use of some of the world's
largest barges by the Southern Pacific Company to construct the railroad causeway (earth fill) across the lake
in the 1950s, with the larger barges capable of hauling
per trip loads of up to 4,000 tons (P-M-1, P-N-1, P-0);
and various navigational uses currently being made of
the lake, including commercial pleasure craft for hire,
recreational sailboat regattas, commercial harvesting of
brine shrimp for processing and marketing throughout
the world, and various scientific craft used to perform
studies on the lake (Exhibit P-P).
Indeed, the physical capacity of the Great Salt
Lake to support comercial navigation as of January 4,
1896, has not been seriously questioned. Nor have the
many successful navigational uses of the lake (before, at,
and after statehood) been seriously questioned. Hardy
simply refused to admit the navigability of the lake and
put the State to its proof. The record abundantly supports the fact of navigable capacity.
The State of Utah thus obtained title to the bed of
the Great Salt Lake on January 4, 1896; and the only
question remaining is whether, or to what extent, subsequent events have vested reliction rights in adjacent
owners so as to divest the State of part of its ownership
interest.
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C.

UTAH HAS NOT BEEN DIVESTED OF
ANY PART OF ITS TITLE TO THE BED
OFTHEGREATSALTLAKE
1. The Doctrine of Reliction Is Not Applicable to

the Exposed Lands Around the Great Salt
Lake
a. Development of the Doctrine:
The doctrine of reliction, as it developed at common law, was bottomed on the concept of de minimus
non cu,rat lex, or the idea that if a matter is insignificant
or trifling, it is not a proper concern of the law and will
not receive judicial cognizance. Thus, when bodies of
water, through the processes of nature, slowly, gradually, and imperceptibly receded and permanently exposed new land that once had been part of the bed, such
newly exposed land was reliction land, and belonged to
the person who owned the estate to which it attached.
The idea was that relictions were exposed slowly and
gradually, and the amount of land emerging during any
limited period of time would be so small that it would be
trifling, trivial, and of little consequence-truly de minimis ! (See the discussion between John A. Carver, Under
Secretary of the Interior, and Congressman David S.
King, Exhibit P-V, pp. 154-55.)
The terms "reliction" and "accretion" are often used
interchangeably, but the same principles of law are applieable to both. Accretion is the natural, slow, imperceptible, and permanent deposit of sediment so as to
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form new land by such deposits. No jurisdiction make
any meaningful distinction between the processes 01
accretion and reliction. The following cases are repre
sentative:

"Technically speaking, land uncovered by 1
gradual subsidence of water is not an 'accretiou,
but a 'reliction,' but the terms are often used in
terchangeably, and the law relating to accretion,
applies in all its features to relictions." Hansor:
v. Thornton, 95 Or. 525, 179 Pac 494 ( 1919).

" 'Accretion' is the process of gradual and im
perceptible addition of solid material called allu
vion, thus extending shore line by deposits mad1
by contiguous waters; and land uncovered b)
gradual subsidence of water is not an 'accretim
but a 'reliction.'" Independent Stock Farm r
Stevens, 128 Neb. 619, 259 N.,:v. 647 (1935).

The question as to whether the doctrine of relictior
applies to the Great Salt Lake has never been decideu
Since the question is one to be determined by Utah la11
in the absence of Utah decisions it might seem helpful 1
look for persuasive decisions in other jurisdictions.
such a search, as well be shown, offers very little as:
guide to the Utah court. }_,,irst, because there is no other
body of water in the United States comparable to th1
Great Salt Lake; and, second, because the cases do not
present a meaningful and consistent body of law.
1

The doctrine of reliction contemplates that the law
will be exposed ( 1) by natural causes, in a ( 2) gradua
and imperceptible manner, and that (3) the newly e\
posed land will be permenently exposed, not to be co1
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ered again by water. With respect to the Great Salt
Lake, it immediately becomes obvious that in lal'ge pal't
the lowering of the watel' level has not been caused by
nature, but by man's activities in withdrawing water
from the tributaries of the lake; that the fluctuating
, water level is not grndual and imperceptible, but rapid
and noticeable; and that the water level at any given
r:
time is anything but permenent. Before illustrating these
facts, it might first be advisable to show that judicial de('isions in other jurisdictions are, at best, of no more than
marginal value as a guide to whether the exposed lands
, around the Great Salt Lake should be deemed reliction
lands.

1

1

b. Federal Decisions:
1

1

1
1

1
1

In County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 23 Wall. (90
U.S.) 46 (1874), the United States Supreme Court, in
speaking of accretions, said that if the deposits were
actually made by the water, then it did not matter whether the cause was a natural or artificial one. Fifty-two
years later, in United States v. Holt State Bank, 270
U.S . .J.9 (1926), the United States Supreme Court reYiewe<l Mud Lake in Minnesota, where the lake had been
drained by artificial dredging, and the bed of the lake
was dry at the time of trial. The Court, contrary to the
suggestion in the Lovingston case, sustained title in the
State rather than in the riparian claimant.
The Department of Interior has decided a number
of cases where waters have fluctuated as a result of artificial causes. One such decision was Rayford W. Win69

ters, A-28125 (Jan. 15, 1960), where the question wa1

whether the United States as a riparian land owner
owned by reliction part of the exposed lands arounJ
Lake Boeuf in Louisiana, so as to entitle the U niteo
States to issue an oil and gas lease. The lake was mud
smaller than it had been when the meander line was sur.
veyed, but part of the reason was because there had been
drainage operations on the lake and because water from
a bayou feeding the lake had been diverted by a canal.
It was ruled that such artificial causes did not divest the
State of Louisiana of its title to the dry land exposed by
such artificial causes:

"The Acting Director held that although the
United States owned sec. 73, the land sought i1
within the original exterior boundary of the lake:
that the lake was navigable in 1812 when Louisi·
ana was admitted into the Union; that title to the
lake bed passed to the State upon its admission
into the Union; that the riparian rights of an
owner of land bordering on a navigable lake do
not entitle him to become the owner of the lano
in front of his property when the bed of a lake
becomes dry if the State owned the lake bed when
it was covered with water; that the United State)
does not own the land sought, even though some
of it mav now be dry land; and, therefore, thal
this Department has no authority to issue an oil
and gas lease thereon."
"According to the information available to thi1
Department, the lake was a navigable. lake in
1812 when Louisiana was admitted mto the
Union. That being so, title to the soil underlyin!
the waters thereof passed to the State. Pollard!'
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Hagen, 3 How. 212 (1844); Shively v. Bowlby,
152 U.S. 1 (1894); United States v. Utah 283
U.S. 64 (1931); United States v. Oregon, 295
U.S. 1 ( 1935) . While the lake is shown on recent topographic maps as being much smaller
now than represented on the township plats made
approximately one hundred years ago, this is said
to be the result of drainage operations and the
diYersion of Bayou Boeuf from the lake by construction of a canal. Such operations do not result
in the transfer of title to the now dry land from
the State to the United States, even though the
United States may still retain land bordering on
the lake as it existed in 1812. Cf. United States
v. Holt State Bank et aL, 270 U.S. 49 (1926)."
"Under the familiar doctrine that it is for the
States to establish for themselves such rules of
property as they deem expedient with respect to
the navigable waters within their borders and the
riparian lands adjacent to them (Arkansas v.
Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158, 175, 176 (1918), we
must look to the laws of Louisiana to determine
the riparian rights of those whose lands border
upon a navigable lake. Apparently the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court of Louisiana
on this subject is State v. Aucoin, 20 So. 2d, 136
( 1944) . There the court said:
'. . . What are the riparian rights of one
whose land borders upon a lake, if the bed of
the lake belongs to the State? Certainly the
riparian rights of an owner of land bordering
upon a lake do not entitle him to become the
owner of the bed of the lake by effect of its becoming dry, either in whole or in part, if the
State owns the bed of the lake
it is covered with water.'"
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"Thus it would appear that any land which
may have formed in front of sec. 73 does not belong to the United States.
"This is not to say, as the appellants suggest,
that the public domain of the United States is
subject to the real property laws of the State of
Louisiana. It is under the laws of the United
States that title to the lake bed vested in the State
iii the first instance and it is under a Federal doctrine that the State has been given the right to
establish its own rules with respect to lands riparian to navigable waters."
c. State Court Decisions:

The decisions of state courts are really quite conflicting, but, for one reason or another, they generally
hold that fluctuations caused by artificial interferences
with natural flows will not cause reliction; and that seasonal or extraordinary fluctuations, even if by natural
causes, will not result in relictions. A few of the cases
will be indicative of what other states have done:
I. Minnesota:

The sudden and artifical drainage of navigable
lake under authority of the state for temporary
period for purpose of permitting lessee to mine
iron ore deposits beneath lake bed, during which
time a substitute channel was provided did not
constitute a 'reliction' so as to vest title to lake bed
in riparian owners. State v. Longyear Holding
Co., 224 Minn. 451, 29 N.W. 2d 657 (1947).
2. F l01·ida :

Where the State itself lowered the level of a
navigable lake, so as to uncover some of the land,
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the uncovered land continued io belong to the
State. Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535 112 So. 274
( 1927).

'

3. lowa:

Drainage through artifical means does not vest
title in the riparian owners, where a lake was
drained through the concurrent actions of a drainage canal and the Missouri River cutting into the
Lake. Nayes v. Collins, 92 Iowa 566, 61 NW 250
(1894).

4. New Yori,·:

'Vhere the land formed was the result of artificial structures no accretion resulted. In re
Broadway in Borough of Bronx, 122 N.Y. Supp.
281, 137 App. Div. 562 (1910).
To vest title by accretion to the upland owner
accretion must take place by imperceptible degree
and must originate from "natural" rather than
artifical causes. In re Triborough Bridge Approach, City of New York, 288 N.Y.S. 697, 159
Misc. 617 ( 1926).
5. Louisiana:

There is no such thing as a right to alluvions or
accretions of land reclaimed with public money.
Bruning v. City of New Orleans, 165 La. 511,
115 So. 733 (1928).
6. California:

Upland owner is not entitled to accretions unless they result from natural
and, wh.ere
the accretions resulted from f ore1gn materials
lodging against a government breakwater, the
creted lands retained their character as pubhc
tidelands and belonged to the state or its grantee.
7 _)

City of L.A. v. Anderson, 206 Cal. 622, 275 P.
789(1924).
Accretions must be the result of "natural"
causes and accretion added by artificial means do
not inure to the benefit of the littoral owner. City
of Newport Beach v. Fager, 39 Cal. App. 2d 23,
102 P.2d 438 (1940).
7. Mississippi,:

Rights of littoral owners are not enlarged by
building artificial structures with public money
which "aid" in the natural deposit of accretion.
Burke v. Commonwealflh, 283 Miss. 63, 186 N.E.
277 (1938).
8. Texas:
Accretion to shores of Gulf of Mexico added
by artificial means remain property of state,
where the land was created by additions to piles
of oyster shells thrown into the water. Lorino v.
Crawford Packing Co., 142 Tex. 51, 175 S.W.
2d410 (1943).
Likewise, if waters are caused to rise or change their
courses through artificial inter£erences, the riparian or
littoral owner is not divested of his upland. For example:
l. New Jersey:

Erosion must be by natural rather than artificial causes before a riparian owner will lose his
land by erosion (opposite of accretion) . Seacoast
Real Estate Co. v. American Timber Co., 92 N.
J. Eq. 293, ll3 A. 489 (1920).
2. Nebraska:

Title to land, gained by accretion, will not be
lost when a small creek, through artificial causes,
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cuts channel across such land. Independent Stock
Farm v. Stevens, 128 Neb. 619, 259 N.W. 647
(1935}.

Generally, with respect to the requirements of "slow
and imperceptible" and "permanency," the courts have
expressed the following views:
I.

Florida:

Reliction is the term applied to land that has
been covered by water, but which has become uncovered by the imperceptible recession of the
water. Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 112 So. 274
(1927}.

2. South Dakota:

The fact that in times of drought the waters of
a large lake receded, so that it was almost wholly
dry, does not, where in wet seasons the lake filled,
show a reliction or permanent retirement of the
waters, whereby riparian proprietors may gain
title to the bottom of the lake. Anderson v. Ray,
37 S.D. 17, 156 N.W. 591 (1916).
Even under a state statute recognizing acquisition of land by riparian owner by accretion and
reliction, the mere temporary recession of waters
occasioned by seasons does not constitute reliction
in sense of addition to contiguous lands. This was
so because the doctrine of reliction required the
permanent uncovering of land, the laying bare of
the bottom by the permanent retirement of
waters and rests in the law of nature and is permanent change that takes place by gradual and
imperceptible degrees, and when water peri?dically rises over land and then recedes there is no
reliction. Hillebrand v. Knapp, 65 S.D. 414, 274
N.W. 821 (1937).
75

An island, consisting of about 25 acres of lan<l
in a meandered lake, which was entirely surround.
ed by water, except in times of extreme low water
when there was no water between it and the me:
antler line of a lot fronting on the lake, was not a
'reliction,' as a reliction is land added to a trac!
fronting upon the waters of a lake, pond, o;
stream by the permanent uncovering of the lan<l
or the laying bare of the bottom by the permanent
retirement of the waters, and the temporary subsidence of the waters occasioned by tbe seasons <n
by periods of drought does not constitute relietion; it being a permanent change that takes place
by gradual and imperceptible degrees, and there
being no reliction where the water periodically
rises over land and then recedes. Flisrand v. Mad-

son, 35 S.D. 457, 152 N.,V. 796 ( 1915).
3. Te,vas:

A submergence of the land by floodwaters ol
itself does not constitute an 'erosion' such as to
destroy the land and if the land subsequently re·
appears by 'reliction' or 'accretion,' the title is not
changed. Hancock v. Moore, Tex. Civ. App., 131

S.,V.2d 45, (1939).

4. Louisiana:

'Dereliction' or 'reliction' is land added to a
front tract by the permanent uncovering of the
waters, the laying bare of the bottom by the re·
tirement of the waters, as contradistinguisheo
from a filling up of the bottom by deposits, cau:·
ing the water to recede. 'Dereliction,' as used ll1
the English law, meant when the sea shrank back
below the usual water mark and remained there
In those cases the law is held to be that, if this ht
by little and little, it should go to the owner of the
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land adjoining. It is recognized by the Louisiana
law as a mode acquiring property, but the mere
temporary subsidence of the waters occasioned bv
the
in the winter and staying
the sprmg, gomg m the summer and gone in the
autumn, does not constitute dereliction, in the
sense of an addition to the contiguous land, sust:eptible of private rights as riparian rights. Sapp
:·. Ji'razier, 51La.Ann.1718, 26 So. 378 (1899).
d. Utah Decisions:
The Utah Supreme Court has never decided the
ex.tent to which artificial interferences prevent the formation of relictions, or the extent to which the concepts
of "gradual and imperceptible" and "permanency" are
limitations on reliction. The Court has, however, expressed the view that it understands reliction to be a "natural" process resulting in a "gradual and imperceptible
recession of waters."
In State v. RoUo, 71Utah91, 262 Pac. 987 (1927),
the State of Utah filed an action to quiet title against a
riparian owner, and, among other things, alleged that a
strip of land exposed around the shore of Utah Lake was
the result of artificial interferences with the inflow to
Utah Lake. The Court found ownership to be in the
State without finding it necessary to decide any questions of accretion or reliction, thus deeming it unnecssary
to determine the consequences of artificial interferences:
" ... the question ... of
or relictioJ?- is
not involved. Further, the doctrme of accretion
or reliction of lands, when applicable,
is
applied to a gradual and imperceptible recession
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of waters of a lake or stream occasioned by nat
ural causes. Whether it is applicable to such at
artificial cause as in the complaint alleged is an
other question, which, for the reasons heretofori
stated, we find unnecessary now to decide." (26i
Pac. at 995).
e. Physical Characteristics of the Fluctuatinr
Level:
Turning to the physical characteristics of the Grea
Salt Lake, and the nature of the lands exposed betweer
the surveyed meander line and the present water's edgt
of the lake, it is obvious that the doctrine of reliction ha,
no application.
l. The lands were not exposed by natural forces:

Exhibit P-D-II shows that the diversions, impound
ments and consumptive uses by man on the tributaries ol
the Great Salt Lake actually lowered the water leve!
three vertical feet by the date of statehood, and 5.3 feet
by 1968. This artificial (non-natural) interferenc thw
exposed 204,000 acres of land at statehood and 374,0011
acres by 1968 (Exhibit P-U, pp. 125-26).
2. The lands were not exposed in a gradual ana

imperceptible manner.
The concept of gradual and imperceptible is rela
tive, but it can hardly be said that the fluctuations of thr
Great Salt Lake are gradual and imperceptible. For ex
ample, from September l, 1966 to December 31, I96n
the water level lowered more than two vertical feet, ex
posing more than 140,000 acres in 122 days, or near!!
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1,200 acres a day. The lake can rise just as fast, as demonstrated in the 92 day period from July 1, 1964 to September 30, 1964, when the water rose approximately
1.75 vertical feet, covering approximately 120,000 acres,
a rate exceeding 1,200 acres per day. Other fluctuations

are comparable. See, generally, Exhibit P-CC, Exhibit
P-U, p. 125, and Exhibit P-D-II.
3. The fluctuating water level does not represent a

permanent change.

The water level has not stabilized at any particular
level, and it cannot be said that any lands have been
"permanently" exposed. Exhibit P-CC shows the water
level of the Great Salt Lake for each month during the
nine year period from 1960 through 1968. The water
level was never at the same level for any two months,
and ordinarily the fluctuations from month to month
would inundate or expose many thousands of acres. A
change of one inch elevation would cover or uncover approximately 5,667 acres (Exhibit P-U, p. 125).
f. Practical Considerations:
If one were to conclude that artificial interferences
with the water level of the Great Salt Lake did not prevent the lands from becoming "reliction" lands subject
to ownership by the riparian owners, many absurd results would necessarily follow. It must be recognized
that if artificial depletion does not prevent the doctrine
of reliction from applying, then artificial acts causing
the water level to rise would divest riparian owners of
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title to lands covered by the higher water level. Consider
the following:
I. What if the State constructed a dike from Saltair

to Antelope Island, and from Antelope Island to Syracuse, impounding water in this newly created reservoir
capable of raising the water level to 4212 feet. This
would not only inundate all lands below the surveyed
meander at an elevation of 4205 feet, but would further
inundate patented lands below the level of 4212 feet,
divesting riparians of fee land as well as the prior "reliction" lands.
2. Assuming the lower reaches of the Jordan River

to be navigable, what if a dam were constructed in the
river to impound water to cover privately owned lands
on both sides of the river, including the many residences
near the stream. Would the private home owners lose
title to their homes because a navigable water had ar·
tificially been raised to cover their land?
3. \Vhat about Lake Powell (or Flaming Gorge)

constructed on a navigable stretch of the Colorado River,
where the bed was owned by the State prior to construe·
tion of the dam? Are all lands inundated by the reservoir now owned by the State?
4. Many comparable examples could be given, but

the most critical aspects of a fluctuating boundary line
relate to management, control and utilization of the ex·
posed lands. These problems are explored in Section C.
3. e. and f. infra.
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It appears clear that the doctrine of reliction has
never been applied to a body of water comparable to the
Great Salt Lake. In fact, the doctrine of reliction has
never been considered in connection with a body of water
comparable to the Great Salt Lake, and the history of
the doctrine at common law shows that its purpose and
its limitations make it totally unsuited to the Great Salt
Lake. It does not apply logically, and could only cause
the most awkward and impractical results if it were to
be applied. It is respectfully suggested that the doctrine
of reliction should be rejected as inapplicable to the
Great Salt Lake and the shore lands surrounding it.
2.

No Common Law Doctrine Can Divest the State
of its Title to the Bed of the Great Salt Lake

As has been shown in the argument immediately preceding, the doctrine of reliction is totally inapplicable to
the Great Salt Lake. Hardy has no claim of title to the
land in question, other than the doctrine of reliction. It
thus should be unnecessary to argue the present point,
but even if it can be assumed arguendo that the doctrine
of reliction could apply to the Great Salt Lake, it becomes clear that such a doctrine cannot divest the State
of its title. In summary, it will now be shown that the
title acquired by the State at statehood cannot be divested by any common law doctrine, but may be divested
or encumbered only when the Legislature, acting in accordance with the mandate of the Utah Constitution,
grants statutory authority to an appropriate state
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agency to act affirmatively in the public interest to dispose or encumber such lands.
At statehood, when Utah received title to the bed
of the Great Salt Lake Article XX of the Utah Constitution declared that all lands of the State "that have
been, or may hereafter be granted to the State by Congress, and all lands acquired by gift, grant or devise,
from any person or corporation, or that may otherwU!e
be acquired, ... shall be held in trust for the people, to
be disposed of as may be provided by law, for the respective purposes for which they have been or may be
granted, donated, devised or otherwise acquired." This
language, as will be seen, has always been interpreted to
include the beds of navigable waters. Thus, with this
constitutional charge, it has been held that the beds of
navigable waters are not subject to claims of accretion,
reliction or any other common law doctrine. Since the
constitutional mandate is that these lands be held in
trust and disposed of as may be provided by law, the
uniform requirement is that the Legislature, in exercising its prerogative over management of state lands,
must designate the manner in which the lands will be developed, controlled, leased or sold. No private or other
interest can attach to diminish state title unless the Legislature makes a specific grant of lands or delegates authority to an administrative agency to encumber or dispose of these lands.
Not surprisingly, all cases, statutes and Opinions
of the Utah Attorney General have consistently and
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clearly recognized and observed the clear constitutional
requirements. At all times since statehood, the boundary
separating patented lands of upland owners from the
state-owned beds of navigable waters has been the highwater mark (line) at the date of statehood. While reliction rights of riparian owners have been recognized to
land exposed by lowering water levels, such reliction
elaims have been categorically rejected when the attempt has been to extend them beyond the high-water
mark at statehood, where they would thus encroach upon
state title. The title of the State of Utah, as acquired at
statehood, and as protected and controlled by the Constitutional declaration, became a boundary that was
fixed and permanent, and any exposed lands lying below and within that boundary line must be managed,
(_'ontrolled and disposed of in the manner declared by the
Utah Legislature.
The Utah Supreme Court never had occasion to
consider or decide this issue until 1927, at which time the
court declared that, from the date of statehood, the title
of the state had not been, and could not be, diminished
by reliction claims. But rather than discuss that case
first, purposes of clarity will be better served by discussing all related legal events in chronological order,
thus examining how each event related to prior events.
The first case of relevance, though of little importance, was decided three years before statehood. In
Poynter v. Chipman, 8 Utah 442, 32 Pac. 690 (1893),
the conflict was between, on the one hand, the plaintiff
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who was a successor in interest of a patentee of the
United States who received title to certain upland bordering on the surveyed meander line of Utah Lake, and,
on the other hand, a private person who, without claim of
title, assumed occupancy of certain exposed land situated between the meander line (boundary described in
the patent) and the water's edge of Utah Lake. The action was brought in ejectment, and the dispute thus centered upon the ownership of the land lying between the
patented upland and the water's edge.
The court proceeded to discuss a number of earlier
cases, rather indicriminately, but failed to distinguish
between those dealing with navigable waters and those
dealing with non-navigable waters. The court then re·
ferred to the common law of England to see whether
utah Lake was navigable, and relying on the common
law notion that waters were navigable only if they were
affected by the ebb and flow of the tide, concluded the
lake was not navigable. The court did recognize, how·
ever, that if Utah Lake were to be considered navigable.
that the state (when subsequently created) would own
the land in dispute.
The court then cited, immediately following and in
support of its conclusion, nineteen cases and one treatise.
Incredibly. the eighteenth case cited was The Daniel
Ball, 77 U.S. 557 ( 1870), decided twenty-three yenrs
earlier by the United States Supreme Court. Incredible
because .The Daniel Ball had specifically rejected the
8-+

test applied by the Utah court, and The Daniel Ball was
citccl in support of such contrary ruling.
Since resolving the question of navigability for purposes of state title determines whether the newly created
state receives, by operation of law at the date of statehood, title from the Federal Government to the beds of
navigable lakes and streams (e.g., U.S. v. Oregon, 295
U.S. 1 ll935); U.S. v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 [1931); U.S.
v. Hult State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 [1926)), it can only be
concluded that the above discussed dicta of Poynter v.
Ohipman was plain wrong. The holding of Poynter v.
Chipman certainly is not of sufficient importance to warrant the rather extensive discussion presented above. But
it was the first case to deal with the problem and sets the
stage for later developments, and, while the dicta was
wrong (as later recognized by the Utah Supreme
Court) , the holding was correct. This is so because the
case simply dealt with the claim of the successor in interest of a federal patentee against the claim of a trespasser; the State of Utah had not been created, and
there was no question of state title; and the court simply
held that one claiming reliction rights under a federal
patent, as against a trespasser with no claim of title, had
a better right to possession of the exposed lands in dispute.
The year following the Poynter decision, the Utah
Supreme Court decided Knudsen v. Omanson, 10 Utah
124, 37 Pac. 250 ( 1894). This decision in this case, still
before statehood, like Poynter, involved a quiet title dis-
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pute to certain lands located between the surveyed meander line of Utah Lake and the water's edge of the lake
(and the Provo River) . These lands seemed to be formed
by accretions, rather than exposed by reliction.
In Knudsen, like Poynter, the dispute was between
an upland owner claiming under a federal patent and u
private person without any claim of title. In 1876, Kund·
sen had entered as a homestead 148.5 acres adjacent to
the meander line, and subsequently received a federal
patent to that land. In 1888, Omanson obtained a lease
from Knudsen to the land situated between Knudsen's
patented land and the water's edge (the area in dispute),
but thereafter Omanson repudiated the lease, claiming
that this land was public domain. However, the court re·
j ected Omanson's claim and concluded he was a tres·
passer.

Knudsen, like Poynter, has more significance as
history than as law. Following so closely on the heels of
Poynter (in point of time), it relied heavily on Poynter,
but did declare (without elaboration) that Utah Lake
was "a navigable body of fresh water, in Utah County,
Utah Territory" ( 37 Pac at 250). The court relied main·
ly on the law of riparian rights in supporting its decision.
But, since Utah had not become a state, no question of
state ownership was involved. This ended the pre-state·
hood decisions.
Then, four years after statehood, the Utah Su·
preme Court decided Hinckley v. Peay, 22 Utah 21, 60
Pac 1012 ( 1900). The issue decided was rather narrow.
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Peay had obtained from the original federal patentee
( Eggertsen) certain patented uplands adjacent to the
meander line of Utah Lake, and thereafter conveyed to
another everything he had obtained by deed from Eggertsen. This title was eventually acquired by Hinckley,
who entered into possession. But then Peay entered upon the land situated between the deeded upland and the
water's edge, claiming that he did not convey more than
the described acreage, and that he never parted with his
title to the exposed lands or "reliction" lands. The court
rejected this, pointing out that Peay not only conveyed
the entire interest described in the deed he (Peay) received from his grantor, but in fact purported to convey
some interest below the meander line. Thus, the court,
relying on the doctrine of riparian rights and on its earlier decisions in Poynter and Knudsen, concluded that
whatever riparian rights might have been owned by
Peay had been conveyed by Peay, and were owned by
Hinckley.
It was not until 1927 that the Utah Supreme Court

had occasion to examine state ownership of the bed of
Utah Lake. But, prior to that time, the question had
been considered by the Utah Attorney General, the Governor, and the Legislature. Therefore, it seems advisable
to digress from the judicial decisions, for the moment,
to review executive and legislative consideration of the
matter.
Early in 1910, the Utah Oil and Liquid Asphalt
Compan; and the California Oil and Asphalt Company
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filed applications with the State Board of Land Commissioners, requesting leases on lands adjacent to
waters of the Great Salt Lake, for the purpose of extracting asphalt and agreeing to pay the state a royalty
of five cents per ton. The Secretary of the State Board
of Land Commissioners, under date of February 15,
1910, inquired of A. R. Barnes, then the Attorney General, whether the state owned the land and minerals in
question, and whether the lease applications could be
accepted. Attorney General Barnes, after concluding
that the Great Salt Lake was navigable, responded:
"After an examination of the authorities, I
have arrived at the conclusion that the lands below high water mark in this lake are the property
of the State by reason of its inherent sovereignty,
and over these lands the State has absolute and
exclusive dominion, including the right to appropriate them to such uses as might best serve its
views of the public interests, and by reason of the
fact that the State has these lands by reason of its
sovereignty and not by any grant from the U. S.
Government, I would say that the minerals or
the lands embraced within the bed of the lake below the high water mark, which contain minerals,
are not reserved to the Government but belong to
the State. Shivley v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. l; McGilvra v. Ross, 30 Supreme Court Reporter,
page 27.
"But the right to dispose of these lands is in
the Legislature. That power has not been delegated to the State Land Board.... " (Biennial
Report of Utah Attorney General, November 30,
1910, pp. 86-88-emphasis added.)
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Apparently prompted by the inquiry that resulted
in the above opinion to the effect that legislation was
needed before there would be authority to lease lands
below the high water mark of Great Salt Lake, Attorney General Barnes recommended to Governor William
Spry, in his biennial report of N ovemher 30, 1910, that
such legislation should be enacted. Accordingly, Governor Spry, in his message to the Ninth Legislature of
the State of Utah, delivered January 10, 1911, stated
(at page 23):
"Of great interest and importance is the recommendation of the Attorney General, that the legislature delegate power to the State Board of
Land Commissioners to lease the lands below the
high water mark of Great Salt Lake, which
tain valuable deposits of asphaltum. In his opinion, it is clearly within your power to make such
delegation and a recommend your favorable action on this suggestion." (Emphasis added)
The Utah Legislature accepted the recommendation of Governor Spry, and in that very Session enacted
Chapter 48, Laws of Utah 1911, declaring state ownership of, and making certain provisions relating to, the
beds of navigable waters. That statute, though since
amended, is now codified as Section 65-1-14, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953.
The next significant events occurred in 1922. HarYey II. Cluff, then the Attorney General, answered a
query from the Utah Sodium Products Company, and
in his opinion, its lease from the state was valid
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to all lands located below the meander line of the Great
Salt Lake-although he emphasized that the matter had
not been decided by the courts. (Biennial Report of the
Attorney General, November 30, 1922, pp. 269-70.)
Attorney General Cluff, later in 1922, issued a 35
page opinion to the State Land Commissioner, rather
exhaustively examining the question of riparian rights.
(Biennial Report of the Attorney General, November
30, 1922, pp. 271-305.) Mr. Cluff proceeded at some
length to examine the Utah constitutional and statutory
provisions, as well as a great number of cases from other
jurisdictions. This opinion is important because it is the
first real discussion of the question of riparian and littoral claims against the State, and, further, because the
position expressed was adopted by the Utah Supreme
Court five years later.
Mr. Cluff reviewed a number of decisions by the
United States Supreme Court, concluding that it was
beyond question that Utah owned title to the beds, banks
and shores, up to ordinary high water mark, on all navigable waters; and that "the rights of riparian and littoral owners are dependent upon the laws and decisions
of the states in which the waters lie" (Page 282, and generally, pp. 274-82). The only question, as Mr. Cluff saw
it, was "whether the State of Utah has asserted its ownership to the beds of its navigable lakes and streams or
has turned over such ownership to said riparian and littoral proprietors" (Page 282). In response to that spe·
cific question, Attorney General Cluff, after a review of
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the Utah constitutional provision and the Utah statutes
governing these lands, rnlcd:
law doctrine governing riparian
and littoral rights had been peremptorily abolished by the constitutional provision before the
laws of 1911, 1917 and 1921. How plain this contention is made when the legislature grants power to lease; says to riparian and littoral proprietors you may unwater the land in front of you and
buy it from the state, providing you cultivate it;
and further says to littoral owners you may buy
that part of the bed in front of you on which you
may have made valuable improvements.
"The terms 'lands belonging to the State lying
below the water's edge of any lake or stream'
found in the 1911, 1917 and 1921 laws, do not in
any way confine the state's rights to the water's
edge wherever it may be. The State as heretofore
pointed out, became the owner of the beds of the
navigable lakes up to ordinary high-water mark
at statehood, by reason of gaining sovereignty.
In order to determine the boundary at statehood,
it will be necessary to definitely ascertain where
the ordinary high-water mark was at that time."
(pp. 286-87)
With this background of events before it, the Utah
Supreme Court, in 1927, was called upon for the first
time to consider state ownership claims to the bed of
Utah Lake. In State v. Rolio, 71 Utah 91, 262 Pac. 987
( 1927) , the State of Utah filed an action to quiet title to
a portion of the bed of Utah Lake, claiming that all of
the area within the surveyed meander line of the lake
was part of the bed, title to which the state obtained as an
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aspect of statehood. Rolio, the defendant, was the owner
of fee land patented prior to statehood, and the patent
had conveyed surveyed lots adjacent to the meander line,
but without specifically mentioning the meander line.
Rolio claimed that, under the law of riparian rights, he
owned the bed of the lake to its center or thread; or, if
not, that by the riparian concept of accretion and reliction he owned to the actual water's edge of the lake. In
dispute, then, was:
(a) Part of the water covered bed of the lake, and
( b) A strip of exposed ( unwatered) land situated
between the meander line and the water's
edge.
Before quoting from the language of that decision,
it is of considerable importance to emphasize the procedural structure of the case which prevented the court from
deciding Rolio's claims of accretion and reliction. Perlmps this can be summarized by itemizing the sequence of
procedures in the following manner:
l. The state initiated the action by the complaint,
in which it alleged that the defendant as a riparian
owner claimed-as against the state, to the center
of the lake, including part of the water-covered
bed and also the strip of land between defendant's
patented land and the water's edge of the lake.
No mention or allegation was made in the complaint that defendant claimed the strip under the
theory of accretion or reliction.

2. The defendant demurred, and the trial court
sustained the demurrer. The state appealed.
3. In his brief as respondent on appeal, defendant
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argued not only that he owned to the center of the
lake under riparian rights, but that in the alternative, he at least owned the strip of land down to
the water's edge, under the doctrine of accretion
and reliction.
4. On appeal, the court said that a demurrer, in
legal effect, admits the allegations of the complaint, and the complaint alleged that defendant's
claim was only that, as a riparian, he owned to the
center of the lake. While the complaint did allege
that defendant claimed ownership of the strip of
exposed land, that claim was based on the theory
that since he owned to the center of the lake, he
necessarily owned the strip as a result thereof. So,
said the court, the defendant-having filed a demurrer to the complaint, could not enlarge upon
or add new issues to the complaint by asserting
new claims or arguments in his brief on appeal.
'l'o assert other claims, the defendant would have
had to file an answer to the complaint, pleading
and placing in issue such other claims.

But the primary significance of State v. Rolio is
the clear holding that with the adoption of the Utah Constitution and the enactment of certain statutes, the state
had-from the beginning, asserted its absolute sovereign
and proprietary rights to the beds of navigable lakes and
streams up to the high-water mark. \Vhether accretion
or reliction could vest in private upland owners any
rights below the surveyed meander line was reserved for
later determination. The following extract explains the
Court's opinion where, after noting that Utah had expressly rejected the common law concept of riparian
rights in connection with water rights, the Court con-
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eluded that the Legislature by adopting the English
common law (Section 2488, Revised Statute 1898) did
not intend to divest the State of title to the beds of na,·igable bodies of water within the state:
"In view of this, it is difficult to percieve that
the Legislature, by the enactment of section 2488,
R. S. 1898, thereby intended, among other things,
to establish and adopt in this state the English
common law doctrine as to riparian owners ; and,
it being conceded, as it is, and the law settled, as
it is beyond all controversy, that the government
grant of the land to the respondent's predecessor,
though bordering on navigable waters, conveyed
no right or title to the bed below high-water mark,
and did not impair the title or dominion of the
future state when created (Shively v. Bowlb.11,
supra), and that, on Utah's admission into the
Union, all lands underlying navigable waters
within the state vested and belonged to the state
in its sovereign capacity (United States v. Holt ·
State Bank, supra), it again is difficult to perceive that the Legislature of Utah, by section
2488, R. S. 1898, thereby intended to divest itself
of such title and vest it in riparian owners bordering on navigable waters.
"Further as to this, and as bearing on the question of whether the state, by any legislative enactment or otherwise, intended to, or did, divest itself of title to the beds of navigable waters: By
the enabling act approved 1894, Utah in 1896 was
admitted into the Union on an equal footing with
the original states. By section 1, art. 20, of the
Utah Constitution, it is provided:
'All lands of the state that have been, or may
hereafter be granted to the state by Congress.
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and all lands acquired by gift, grant or devise,
from any person or corporation, or that may
otherwise be acquired, are hereby accepted and
declared to be the public lands of the state; and
shall be held in trust for the people, to be disposed
of as may be provided by law, for the respective
purposes for which they have been or may be
granted, donated, devised or otherwise acquired.'
"Thereunder beds of navigable waters are included as 'public lands of the state,' as 'otherwise
acquired.'" Nortihern Pac. R. Co. v. Hirzel,
supra.
"By section 2325, R.S. 1898, at the same session when section 2488 was adopted, the Legislature of Utah provided for a board of land commissioners to direct, manage, and control 'all
lands heretofore or which may hereafter be granted to this state by the government, or otherwise,
for any purpose whatever, except lands used or
set apart for public purposes or occupied by public buildings and shall have the power to sell or
lease the same for the best interest of the state
and in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter and the Constitution of the state.' In
1911, Laws Utah 1911, p. 65, Section 2325, was
amended, still given the board direction, management, and control 'of all lands heretofore, or which
may hereafter be granted to this state, by the
United States government, or otherwise, and to
lands lying below the water's edge on any lake or
stream to the bed of which the state is entitled,
for any and all purposes whatever, except lands
used or set apart for public purposes or occupied
by public buildings, and shall have the power to
sell or lease the same for the best interests of the
state and in accordance with the provisions of
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this chapter and the Constitution of the state;
provided, that lands belonging to the state, lying
below the water's edge of any lake or stream shall
not be sold.' In 1917 (Laws Utah 1917, p. 387)
the section was further amended permitting the
sale of the bed of a lake or bay, which riparian
owners may desire to purchase, at not less than
$2.50 per acre. In 1919 (Laws Utah 1919, p.
302), in 1921 (Laws Utah 1921, p. 317), and in
1925 (Laws Utah 1925, p. 51), further amendments and provisions were made respecting sales
and leasing of lands of the state, including lands
underlying navigable waters, but, in case of sale
of any portion of the bed of any lake or stream,
the state reserved all mineral rights therein. Then
in 1927 (Laws Utah 1927, p. 8), the Legislature
in express terms reasserted the state's title to the
beds of all navigable waters. It thereby was provided:
'Sec. 2. That the title to the beds of said rivers
(Colorado and Green Rivers) and of each of
them, as well as the title to the beds of all other
streams and lakes which at the time of said admission of Utah into the Union were navigable
in fact, vested in the state of Utah at the time of
its said admission into the Union and said title
has at all times thereafter been and now is vested
in the State of Utah, except such portion or portions thereof as may have been heretofore disposed of by the State of Utah pursuant to law, by
express grant.' (262 P. 63]
"This legislation, notwithstanding section 2488,
R. S. 1898, clearly indicates a legislative intent
and policy wholly inconsistent with the English
comon law doctrine of riparian owners owning or
acquiring any right, title, or interest in or to beds
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of navigable waters of this state. It thus is clear
that, by Section 2488, R. S. 1898, the Legislature
did not intend to adopt or establish in this state
the English common law doctrine as to riparian
owners giving them any right, title, or interest in
or to beds of navigable waters within the state;
and that such common law doctrine is repugnant,
not only to our laws just referred to, but also to
our laws relating to irrigation and water rights,
and is wholly unsuitable and inadaptable to our
conditions and is destructive of the basic principles upon which our laws relating to irrigation
and water rights are founded.
"'Ve are therefore of the opinion, and the ruling is, that the respondent did not, nor did his
predecessor in interest, in virtue of the grant from
the government, or of section 2488, R. S. 1898, or
otherwise, as a riparian owner acquire any right,
title, or interest in or to the bed of the lake but

{/wt the title vhereto, including the strip, on
Utah's admission into the Union, vested in the

state in its sovereign capacity, and that the state
did not by any legislative enactment divest itself
of such title. Nor is there anything appearing on
the face of the complaint that it did so by grant
or otherwise." (262 Pac. at 992-93)

The court then turned its attention to the earlier
Utah cases of Poynter v. Chipman, Knudsen v. Omanson, and Hinckley v. Peay (all cited supra), which were
cited and relied on by defendant to support the argument
of accretion and reliction raised in his brief. 'Vhile the
court refused to decide any accretion or reliction question, it did say that these earlier Utah cases were not
H uthority to support any reliction or accretion claim

against the state; and that it would take at least a state
statute to recognize any such rights.
Thus, in State v. Rolio the Utah Supreme Court
made clear that the State of Utah, by virtue of its constitution, asserted its ownership and control of all state
lands (including beds of navigable waters up to highwater mark), and declared that these lands were to be
disposed of only in the manner provided by legislative
enactment. While the court refused to decide directly
any question of accretion or reliction, it did say that those
doctrines could not apply to divest the state of any title
unless the legislature had expressly said so; and that the
legislature had not said so, but had said the exact opposite.
The Utah Supreme Court decided only two cases
after State v. Rolio that have any real bearing on the
Rolio holding. Both dealt primarily with questions relating to burden of proof, but they add some clarification and deserve discussion. The first, decided in 1930,
involved the Great Salt Lake; the second, decided in
1947 (and 1950), involved Utah Lake. For purposes of
continuity in this discussion, it seems advisable to discuss
both of these cases at this juncture--even though there
were intervening opinions by the Utah Attorney General.

Robinson v. Thomas, 75 Utah 446, 286 Pac. 625
( 1930), involved a dispute between the plaintiff as a
lessee of the state and the defendant, who claimed under
placer mining claims. The area in dispute contained sub98

stantial salt deposits and was located between the sur\·eyed meander line and the water's edge of the Great
Salt Lake. The plaintiff, asserting his right to possession
under his lease from the state, claimed that the area in
dispute was owned by the state as a part of the bed of
the lake. The defendant, relying on his placer mining
claims, denied that the area was part of the bed of the
lake, and asserted that it was part of the public domain
open to location.
The state was not a party. No question of accretion
or reliction was involved. But since the plaintiff (the
state's lessee) had the burden of proof (and attempted
to show state title), and since the defendant sought to
prevail on the weakness of the state's claim of title (as
presented by plaintiff), the case is at least interestingparticularly in light of Provo City v. Jacobsen, the next
case to be discussed. But in Robinson, the trial court
ruled that the plaintiff had failed to carry the burden of
proving state ownership; on appeal the Utah Supreme
Court reversed, saying:
"The disposition of the case turns on the question of whether the state did or did not have title
or right of possession. No direct finding was made
as to such determinative factor or issue. That is,
no direct finding was made as to whether the state
was or was not the owner of the premises or entitled to the possession of them. As to that, the
court merely found that the plaintiff failed to
prove that the state was the owner of the premises. The plaintiff had the burden of proving such
issue. If he failed to do so, a finding with respect
thereto ought to have been made against him.
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"HoweYer, considering the finding which was
made as being equivalent to a finding that the
state was not the owner, how stands the case? On
the record we think sufficient evidence was adduced to justify a finding that the state was the
owner. The lands in question are situated along
the northerly portion of Great Salt Lake and at
or near the south boundary of Promontory Point,
a point of land about twenty miles long and about
four or five miles wide extending in a souther!>·
direction in the lake, or rather between the lake on
the one side and Bear River Bay on the other.
The defendants do not dispute the proposition
that when Utah was admitted into the Union of
States in 1896, title in fee to all lands underlying
naYigable waters within the state vested in the
state in its sovereign capacity, and that such
may be disposed of by the state as it may elect.
subject only to the paramount power of Congress
to control such waters for purposes of navigation
in commerce among the states and with foreign
nations. 'Ve so held in the case of State v. Rolio
(Utah) 262 P. 987. Following the rule announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in
the case of Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 14 S,
Ct. 548, 38 L.Ed. 331, and other cases cited in
the Rolio Case, we also held that such title vested
in the state to all lands below high water, and that
the state had the right to dispose of such lands as
it might elect. V\T e further held that the common
law as to riparian owners does not obtain in this
state, and hence owners of land abutting navigable waters acquire no right or title to the bed
thereof below high water. It is not alleged in the
complaint, nor was evidence given to show, that
Great Salt Lake was a navigable body of water.
'ye, however, take judicial notice that the lake is
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about eighty miles long and from twenty to forty
miles wide and is navigable or susceptible to navigation; that its waters are about 22 per cent salt,
and wherever they are evaporated a deposit of
salt is left on lands theretofore covered with
water; and that the lake is wholly within the state.
The lands in question at the commencement of
this action were covered with salt about two feet
deep, and are valuable only for such salt deposits.
The plaintiff in virtue of his lease with the state
had the right to remove such deposits for commercial purposes. The chief contention of the defendants is that the plaintiff failed to show where
the meander line of the lake was in 1896 when
Utah was admitted into the Union of States, and
failed to show that the lands in question either at
high or low water were covered with waters of the
lake." (75 Utah at 449-50)
Then after discussing certain evidence showing that
the land in question had actually been water covered at
or within a few years after statehood, the court concluded:
"We think there is ample evidence to justify a
finding that the lands in question were a part of
the bed of the lake when Utah was admitted as a
state and that the title thereto then vested in the
state. There is not anything to show that the stah'
thereafter divested itself of title or right of possession." ( 7.5 Utah at 451)

Provo City v. Jacobsen involved a title dispute to
certain lands located between the surveyed meander line
and the water's edge of Utah Lake, required by Provo
City in connection with the construction of a municipal
airport. Provo City acquired from the state a lease to
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these lands, and then commenced a suit against about
forty defendants who were owners of patented uplands
adjacent to the meander line. The complaint alleged that
the defendants had no interest in the subject lands because they were owned by the state and leased to Provo
City, but that if the court found any of the defendants
to have any interest, that all such ownership rights be
condemned and compensation therefor paid to such defendants. The State of Utah intervened, asserting its
claim to ownership, and thus the validity of the Proyo
City lease from the state. The case was tried in the district court and appealed (111 Utah 39, 176 P.2d 130
[ 1947)) ; a petition for rehearing was granted ( 111 Utah
68, 181 P.2d 213 [1947)), and the case remanded for
further proceedings in the trial court; and a second ap·
peal followed (117 Utah 507, 217 P.2d 557 [1950}).
The Provo City case is significant because it clearly confirmed two propositions laid down in the Rolio
case and either established or clarified three other propositions. Confirmed were the following two rules that had
been set forth in Rolio:
1. The State of Utah, at the date of statehood,
obtained absolute title to the beds of navigable
waters located below the mean high-water mark
at statehood; and,

2. The common law doctrine of accretion and reliction cannot apply to divest the state of any of
its title acquired at statehood.
However, the Provo City case also clarified the fol·
lowing rules :
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1. The high-water mark at statehood need not
necessarily be the same as the surveyed meander
line; and,

2. One assuming the burden of proving the location of the high-water mark, as of the date of
statehood, must do so by a preponderance of the
evidence or his claim to ownership will fail; and,
3. If a strip of exposed land exists between the
suveyed meander line and the mean high-water
mark at statehood, such land can be acquired by
private upland patentees through the doctrine of
accretion and reliction, because such extended
ownership does not encroach upon state lands.

On the first appeal, the court recognized that the
meander line might be assumed in law to be the mean
high-water mark, but that no party had relied on such
an assumption, and all parties had introduced evidence
attempting to show the location of a physical mark as
the high-water line.
Generally, the court's opinion in the first Provo
City appeal on this point is contained in the following
language:
"The state concedes that the meander line is
not necessarily the boundary line. Knudsen v.
Omanson, 10 Utah 124, 137 P. 350; State v. Rolio, 71 Utah 91, 262 P. 987; Shively v. Bowlby,
152 U.S. 1, 31, 14 S. Ct. 548, 38 L.Ed. 331. There
are cases which indicate that in the absence of evidence to the contrary the meander line as established represents the high water mark and is
therefore the boundary line. State v. Imlay, 135
Or. 66, 294 P. 1046. Here there was much evidence both on the part of the state and the defend103

ants as to the levels of the water during the perind
from 1884< to the time Utah became a state aud
to the times when and how much of the land wa-.;
covered during the various parts of the period,
and as to the condition of this ground during that
time. In view of this fact, we are not called u pun
to assurne an.11 fact but rnust determine wlwt the:
perponderance of the evidence is.
"The state having failed to prove that these
lands were below the high water mark of the lake
at the time utah became a state, it cannot succeed
under any theory of the law in regard to
lands and it is unnecessary for us to decide any of
the many other questions argued by the various
counsel in their brief. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Costs against plaintiff."
( 176 P.2d 132-33)

Chief Justice Larson dissented, delivering a rather
exhaustive opinion as to the merits of the respective
claims of ownership. However, there is no disagreement
expressed between the majority and dissenting opinion
as to the merits-Justice Larson simply thought the burden of proof rule had no utility and would never permit
meaningful litigation on the merits. On rehearing, the
court concluded that additional evidence needed to be
considered to fix the high water mark, as it existed on the
date of statehood, and sent the case back to the trial
court for further proceedings :
"The former decision is therefore modified to
conform with the views herein expressed and the
case is remanded to the district court to take further evidence if the parties so desire on the issues
herein discussed but not previously determined.
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And from such evidence and the evidence already
received the court shall fix and determine the exact location of the high water mark as it was 011
these lands at the time Utah became a state, and
therefrom fix a boundary line between the state
and these defendants on that high water mark,
and quiet the title of the lands of the respective
parties. Each party to pay his own costs."
The second appeal in the Provo Cit,l} case added
nothing new, since the court simply affirmed the trial
court's ruling that the state had not carried its burden of
proof in showing the exact location of the mean high
water mark.
Before leaving the Utah judicial decisions, two
other cases should be noted, simply for the purpose of
showing that they add nothing to the foregoing discussion. Thomas v. Farrell, 82 Utah 535, 26 P.2d 328
( 1933), involved a dispute between two private parties
under a sales contract, whereby certain salt was extracted by the plaintiff from the shores of the Great Salt Lake
and delivered to the defendant. The plaintiff had no
claim of title, and asserted none, to the salt-and the
court held that he could not recover the purchase price.
The other case, Farrer v. Johnson, 2 Utah 2d 189, 271
P.2d 462 ( 1954), involved a dispute as to certain tax
deeds purporting to include certain lands located below
the meander line of Utah Lake. So far as relevant here,
the court followed the Provo City holding, observing
that lands below the meander line (but above the high
water mark) were subject to ownership by private upland owners.
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Returning to the opm1ons of the Utah Attorney
General, it can be said that at all times each Attorney
General who has been asked any question concerning
ownership of the beds of navigable waters, has consistently expressed the views first declared by Attorney
General Barnes in 1910-often with exhaustive research
and discussion. During this sixty-year period there have
been eight major opinions without the slightest conflict
or inconsistency, and those opinions have been fully confirmed by the decisions of the Utah Supreme Court, as
discussed above.
In summary, the foregoing analysis of the Utah
Law shows that, since statehood, the Utah Constitution,
statutes, judicial decisions, and administrative opinions
have clearly and consistently recognized absolute state
ownership to the beds of all navigable waters below high
water mark at the date of statehood. As to this land:
1. The ownership interest of the state cannot be
divested, lost, or diminished through accretion.
reliction, adverse possession, or otherwise; except
2. Through a direct legislative grant, or a specific
administrative act authorized by statute; but
3. Lands situated above the high water mark, and

thus not owned by the state, may be subject to
private ownership through the doctrine of accretion and reliction.
3. The Surveyed :Meander Line of the Great Salt

Lake, in Law and in Fact, was at Statehood and Still Is - the High 'Vater Line of the Lake
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a. The High Water Line is Usually Located
at the High Water Mark.
It is clear that Utah's title to the bed of the Great
Salt Lake included everything within the high water
line of the lake at the date of statehood. It is equally
clear that such ownership has not been diminished by
the common law doctrine of reliction. And finally, it is
clear that the high water line was the same as the meander line.

Most cases suggest that the high water line will be
found by locating a physical mark on the shore. The
mark might be caused by frequent and prolonged inundation so as to destroy (or prevent the growth of) vegetation, or it might be caused by erosion from wave action,
or a combination of the two. The Utah Supreme Court
used typical language in Provo City v. Jacobsen, 111
Utah 39, 176 P.2d 130, 132 (1947), when it said:
" 'High-water mark' means what the term indicates-a mark on the land impressed by the water
upon the soil by covering it for sufficient lengths
of time so that it is deprived of vegetation and its
value for agricultural purposes is destroyed."
Of course, in the Provo City case the court was
dealing with a fresh water lake, and the land in dispute
was being used by private claimants for agricultural
purposes. There was no reason to suppose that a physical
mark could not be found, and, indeed, there was much
testimony and other evidence by all parties relating to
such physical marks around the lake.
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llut the Great Salt Lake is different ..\s ''ill lw
shown, the very nature of the lake is unique in that it i.\
totally lacking in those features "·hich cause water
marks; i.e., water sufficiently fresh to permit growth of
vegetation, reasonably stable water levels at high water.
and shores or banks with sufficient grade to permit erosion marks. Absent these characteristics, no water mark
will be found, and it will not be possible to locate a high
water line with reference to a physical water mark.
It might be obsened that a physical mark is not always required to show a high water line. \Vhere a physical mark does not ordinarily appear to show the line of
high water, then resort may be had to measurement or
calculation of actual water levels at ordinary high water.
Thus, with respect to tidal waters, each day there are
two low tides and two high tides, and each month there
is a period of exceptionally low tide (neap tide) and
exceptionally high tide, and each 18.H years there is a
complete cycle of all high tides. Thus, the line of ordinary high tide (the average of the two daily high tides
equirnlent to mean high water) is determined, not by
reference to a physical mark, but by taking the average
elevation of all high tides during the 18.6 year cycle.
United States v. TVashington, 294 F.2d 830 (1961);
Borrt.r' Consolidated, Ltd. v. City o.f Los Anyeles, 2!l(\
U.S. 10 (1935). But, with respect to fresh waters not
affected by the tides, the line of ordinary high "ater
cannot he calculated with such precision, and
physical marks sene as a better measure of the hound108

ary. Thus, in United States v. TVashington, the Court
(at page 83.J.) :

n

"In the case of ti<lal waters such as are involved
here, the high-water mark means the line of high
water as determined by the course of the tides,
not as determined by physical markings made
upon the ground by the water. The latter method
of making this determination, which was followed
by this district court, is appropriate only in the
case of streams and other non-tidal waters which
have no absolute acertainable level because ot'
,·ariations of flow from a multitude of causes."
Herein lies the dilemma: As to fresh waters, the
high water line will be found by reference to a physical
mark; as to ocean or tidal waters, the high water line
will be found by calculating with precision the actual
average elevation of the water at ordinary high tide. Hut
the Great Salt Lake is not fresh water (it in fact has a
much higher salt concentration than any ocean) and has
no well-defined physical mark representing high water
at statehood; and the lake does not fluctuate with precision as do tidal waters (in fact its fluctuations are erratie, frequent, substantial and totally unpredictable).
\ Vhat then? If a mark cannot be found to serve as
the high water line at statehood, and the fluctuations of
the water are too arratic to permit a precise calculation
oJ' high water, is Utah somehow to be denied title to the
bed of the lake? If the exact boundaries or dimensions
of the bed cannot be demonstrated by a physical mark
measurement of a stable and consistent high water
('.vl'le, does this mean that the bed cannot be delineated,
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and that, therefore, there is no bed? Obviously not, but i1
does mean that there is a necessity of ascertaining a lirn
or boundary that, under the circumstances, is most apt
to represent or approximate the mean high water line at
statehood-thus approximating the elevation where a
physical mark would have formed if the nature of the
lake had permitted. Fortunately, the surveyed meander
line, both in law and fact, logically and fairly represents
the high water line at statehood.
b. A Surveyed 1"1eander Line may be Presumed in Law to be the High 'V" ater Line
A surveyed meander line, if surveyed to establish
the high water mark, may be presumed in law to be the
continuing high water mark until some party wishes to
introduce evidence to show that the high water line has
changed. The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the
applicability of this principle, and in Provo City v. ,Jacobsen, lll Utah 39, 176 P.2d 130, 132 (1947), observed:
"There are cases which indicate that in the ahsence of evidence to the contrary the meander line
as established represents the high water mark and
is therefore the boundary line. State v. Imlal1.
135 Or. 66, 294 P. 1046. Here there was mul'h
evidence both on the part of the state and the defendants as to the Ie,,els of the water during th·
period from 1884 to the time Utah became a
and as to the times when and how much of this
land was covered during the various parts of that
period, and as to condition of this ground during
that time. In view of this fact, we are not called
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upon to assume any fact but must determine what
the preponderance of the evidence is." [Emphasis added]
It is important to note the reason why the court did
not rely on the surveyed meander line as the high water
line. This was because there was no showing that the
meander line had been initially surveyed as the high
water mark, and because the parties did not request it to
do so. The court specifically said that "in the absence of
evidence to the contrary the meander line as established
represents the high water mark and is therefore the
boundary line," but because there was "much evidence"
as to the location of the high water mark, the court concluded that "In view of this fact, we are not called upon
to assume any fact but must determine what the preponderance of the evidence is."

In the case at bar, the State has at all times maintained that the surveyed meander line should be presumed to be the high water line, and no evidence has
been introduced by the State (or by Hardy either, for
that matter) to show a high water mark at any other
elevation. The evidence introduced by the State with
respect to water levels has been to show that the surveyed
meander line is a reasonable presumption in fact as well
as law.
The pleadings show that on December 26, 1968, the
parties filed joint motions for summary judgment, representing in paragraph A that there was "no dispute as
to any material fact in this proceeding" and in paragraph
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B that "the issues of law to be determined by the Court
... are as follows ... 3. ls the official surveyed meander
line of the Great Salt Lake presumed to be the continuing and present mean high water mark of said lake('
l<'urther, in the Stipulation Amending Pleadings,
dated December 26, 1968, the parties specifically stipulated and recited their respective claims as to issues of
law, and on page () it was stated, as one of the State's
claims, that:
" (d) Any party claiming that an official surveyed meander line is not the present and effective high water mark or line of a navigable body
of water, must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the mean high water mark has permanently changed, and must specifically identify
and locate the mean high water mark as thus
changed, because a surveyed and approved meander line is presumed in law to be the mean high
water mark of such navigable body of water until that presumption is rebutted and overcome."
As a matter of fact, Hardy does not claim that the
surveyed meander line was not the mean high water line
and thus the boundary of the bed of the lake at statehood. On the contrary, Hardy specifically admits that,
if the lake is navigable, the lands in dispute were once
part of the bed of the lake, but that Hardy has divested
the State of title by the doctrine of reliction (Stipulation
Amending Pleadings, page 4, paragraph b).
The only point to be made from the discussion immediately preceding is that, unlike the Provo CitJJ case,
the State in this litigation has at all times expressly and
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specifically relied on the presumption that the surveyed
meander line was at statehood, and has continued to be,
the high water line (mark), and thus the boundary between the state owned bed and the surrounding uplands.
That presumption, as recognized by the Utah Supreme
Court in the Provo ca,se, has often been applied, and has
never been rejected in any case where evidence was not
put in the record to show a physical mark at some other
elevation or location. Thus, in United States v. Otley,
34 F. Supp. 182, 184 (D.C. Ore., 1940), the court said:
"A meander line follows the contour of such a
body Clake} at the mean high-water mark, with
disregard for elevations and slight yariations of
the shore to set off a body of upland for which the
United States may receive payment from patentees."

The same holding is set forth in Martin v. Busch, 112 So.
274, 283-84 (1927). And, in State v. Imlay, 34 Ore. 66,
294 Pac. 1046 ( 1931), the court said:
"In the absence of proof to the contrary, we
must assume that the meander lines as so established and marked upon the ground truly represent the point to which the waters of the river
were raised during ordinary stages of high water
at that time."
Also of significance is the fact that the United
States Supreme Court, in United States v. Oregon, 295
U.S. 1 (1935), adopted and approved a Special Master's
finding that the meander line was the mean high-water
mark at the time it was surveyed.
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c. The Meander Line of the Great Salt Lake
was Surveyed at the Elevation of the High
Water Line
The Great Salt Lake was surveyed in 1850 for the
express purpose of locating the surveyed meander at the
mean high water line. Stansbury clearly recites how he
complied with what is now Section 226 of the Manual
of Surveying Instructions, United States Department
of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management:

"All navigable bodies of water and other important rivers and lakes (as hereinafter described) are to be segregated from the public
lands at the mean high-water elevation." (Exhibit P-HH, Section 226) [Emphasis added}
The survey by Captain Howard Stansbury to establish the meander line was the only attempt that has ever
been made to establish an actual high water line or elevation of the lake. His task at that time was not easy, but
no survey, before or after, could have produced any
better result. Stansbury actually reached the area of the
Great Salt Lake in 1849, having been sent to survey the
Great Salt Lake by the United States Army Topographical Engineer Corps. In October and November
of that year he traveled the shores of the lake and made
visual observations, his notes reflecting that he was
searching for benches or water marks, including logs or
debris that might have been deposited as a drift line or
drift mark indicating a high water line (see, generally
Exhibit D-2, pp. 27-38). When Stansbury actually commenced his survey of the lake in April, 1850, he noticed
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a rather continuous line of driftwood that impressed him
as a probable high water line, and he noted:
"Drift-wood is scattered along the shores at an
elevation of four or five feet above the present
level of the lake, which must have maintained that
height for a considerable period, since in numerous spots along the drift line unmistakable evidence of a well-defined beach are still be be traced
with perfect precision." (Exhibit P-V, p. 35)
Stansbury thus proceeded to survey the storm line
or driftwood line as the high water line. It is interesting
to compare Stansbury' s note that the drift line was "four
or five feet above the present level of the lake," because
his survey located the high water line at an elevation of
J.205 feet and the hydro graph confirms the water level
at that time to have been 4201 feet, which was exactly
the same level as at statehood (See Exhibit P-T). After
a time, however, Stansbury revealed his desire that every
part of the survey reflect an accurate high water line. He
wrote:

"As therefore, my ob,ject was to survey the shore
of the lake in its present stage, I determined to
abandon, in this instance, the storm line, and to
run the line of survey to a point west of the water,
as it then was, and thence to strike across the flat
to Strong's Knob, triangulating upon the prominent points of the different ranges, so as to obtain
their general shape and distance, and sketching
in the intervening ground. This course would secure all the ends of practical utility, without the
hazard and delay to be incurred by penetrating
the desert." (Exhibit P-V, pp. 35-36) [Emphasis
added]
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However, only a few days later, Stansbury e11
countered a storm, and he was made aware how the lak1
could fluctuate with no adrnnce warning, obvious!)
alerting him to other physical factors requiring evalua
tion in locating the high water line:
"The water, under the influence of the north
ern blast, rose upon the beach crossed by the lirn
a few days hence so as to extend some six or sew11
miles to the south of it; but this morning it hail
returned its old boundaries, upon the subsidem
of the gale." (Exhibit P-V, p. 36)

0

During the same period of time, Lt. Gunnison, an
assistant to Captain Stansbury, had been surveying the
eastern shore of the lake, and reported similar diff icul·
ties in locating the high water line. Gunnison wrote:
"Two lines have been located, the shore of t111
lake, and the base of the hills, in order to giYe thr
flat occupied by the farmers .... The lake waters
are driven by storms over the flat and wash off
from the buttes, which will soon disappear. Driftwood is found some miles from the present shore."
(Exhibit P-V, p. 36)
Without further detailing the difficulties encoun·
tered by Captain Stansbury and his survey party in lo·
eating the high water line of the lake, it is important to
emphasize that he was endeavoring to locate and delineate the shore of the lake by establishing a high water
line, as he was obligated to do under the official instruc·
tions to the cadastral engineers (Exhibit P-HH). As
stated above, Stansbury's surYey of the meander line
was obYiously his best effort by using his talents a!Hl
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training as a cadastral engineer to locate the high water
mark. He arrived in the vicinity of the lake in 1849,
spent the fall traveling around the lake and observing its
features, and completed his survey in the Spring of 1850.
YVhile Stansbury could not locate a well-defined high
water mark, his notes reflect that he adjusted his suryeying procedures from time to time to establish what,
in his judgment, was the "shore of the lake in its present
stage." No other survey to define the shore of the lake
and find a high water line has ever been made, and
Stansbury's survey was accepted by the United States
Surveyor General in 1855 (obviously the Surveyor General, upon a review of Stansbury's notes, approved of
method and manner of determining the high water line) .
The reasons why a high water mark, as exists on
other lakes, cannot be found on the land around the
Great Salt Lake are obvious. No vegetation line will
appear because the salt content of the water prevents
the growth of vegetation, and any areas covered by water
for any length of time, whether frequently or infrequently, will not support vegetation. The permanence of this
saline impact is noticed as far away as the Bonneville
Salt Flats, where, to this day, no vegetation grows.
Similarly, no definitive erosion mark is left-but
for a different reason. Since the lake has no outlet, it has
no way of stabilizing the water level at any time. The
spring discharge of the tributaries raises the level of the
water markedly, and then evaporation rapidly lowers
the level-which results in an annual fluctuation aver117

aging between two and three feet in vertical elevatio
(Exhibits P-T, P-CC). This fluctuation is greatly mag
nified by the fact that the shores of the lake are almos
level, and since a one foot rise in water level will inundat1
approximately 68,000 acres, the average annual fluctua
tion causes the water to encroach upon and recede frorr
a shore area comprised of anywhere between 125,001
and 200,000 acres (Exhibit P-U, p. 125; Exhibits P-T
P-CC). Thus, the level shore areas permit the water ti
roll over them without leaving an erosion line at higli
water, and this phenomenon is accentuated by the in.
creased fluctuation resulting from the fact that there j,
no outlet to regulate the level of the lake.
In summary, as to the absence of a physical mark !11
show a high water line, it can be said that there is no bod:
of water comparable to the Great Salt Lake within the
geographical jurisdiction of Anglo-American jurisprn
dence. Certainly no body of water, with the exception of
the Dead Sea, can match the salt and mineral content ol
the waters of the Great Salt Lake. Further, no body of
water has been found where a combination of no outlet
plus flat shore lands results in an annual inundation of
such vast areas. This is to say that there has never been
an occasion in legal history to require a physical mark
as proof of a high water line on a body of water compar·
able to the Great Salt Lake.

The United States Department of Interior has
recognized this fact, but, rather than accept the surveyed
meander as the high water line, has suggested creating n
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new rule of law-not heretofore applied anywhere else,
but claimed to be applicable to the Great Salt Lake because of its unique nature. Thus, the Department of Interior, in its attempt to claim as against the State of Utah
various portions of the exposed lands, has sought to impeach the official federal survey as to its accuracy in
locating the shoreline. The Department of Interior admits that the high water line is the correct boundary, and
that the Stansbury Survey was an effort to locate that
line, but now (over 100 years later) for the first time
questions the accuracy of the result. Consider the following language from the Decision of Karl Landstrom, Director of the Bureau of Land Management of the United States Department of Interior:
"It therefore follows that customary methods
of determining the high water mark, as suggested
in the survey manual, are not capable of application to Great Salt Lake. The principle embodied
in the manual's instructions is that the annual flux
and reflux of a lake carves upon its shores guidelines to the location of the mean high water mark.
This is based upon the asumption that each year's
cycle is repeated within the same range: that the
low and high water levels for one year will be
about the same as the low and high water levels
for any other year, and that marks on the ground
will result from, and reflect, the lake's constantly
receding from, and returning to, the same levels.
But this assumption, as we have seen, is not valid
for Great Salt Lake. Similarly, the use of vegetation as a guide to determining the mean high
water mark is applicable only in situations where
the chief deterrent to the growth of vegetation is
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the presence and action of water against a shore,
whereas the absence of vegetation on hundreds of
square miles of land adjacent to Great Salt Lake
is due to other reasons, not connected with the location of the shoreline in historic times.
"It therefore follows that if this Bureau's cadastral engineers were to use their customarv
guidelines in determining the high water mark o.f
Great Salt Lake, they would, like Captain Stansbury, often be operating miles from the waters of
the lake, and their results would have no relationship to the configuration of the lake as it existed
in 1896, or as it exists today, or as it existed at any
other time back to which the records of mankind
extend." (Exhibit D-X, pp. 37-38).
The Director of the Bureau of Land Management
thus concluded that since there was doubt whether Stansbury accurately located the high water mark in his survey, and since it would be impossible to make an accurate
survey of the high water mark today, that an entirely
new concept should be applied to locate the boundary of
the bed of the lake-namely, the actual water's edge,
which, though admittedly not the boundary on other naYigable bodies of water, should be the boundary on the
Great Salt Lake because it is easy to ascertain the actual
level of the water at any given time. That reasoning
doesn't have much appeal in logic, and it has no support
in law.
d. The Surveyed Meander Line Has a Reasonable Basis in Fact as the High Water Line
The Great Salt Lake presents a particularly compelling logic for presuming the surveyed meander line
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as the continuing mean high water line. It is now impossible to survey or otherwise ascertain a mean high water
line for the date of statehood. And, not only did Stansbury attempt to locate the high water mark when he
made the only survey ever attempted for that purpose,
but the water level at the time of his survey in 1850 was
the same as the water level on January 4, 1896 when
Utah became a state (Exhibit P-T). Thus, if Stansbury
used his best efforts to locate a high water line in 1850,
and if in 1896 the water level was exactly the same, why
should one presume, or even argue, that there was a different mean high water line in 1896? As a matter of fact,
the hydrograph shows that for the thirty years preceding statehood ( 1866-1896), the actual water level of the
lake was at or above the meander line during 23 years
and was below the meander line only 7 years (Exhibit
P-T) . And further, there was not a single year between
1850 and 1900 (with the possible exception of 1861)
when the actual water level of the lake did not equal or
exceed the level of the lake at the time Stansbury made
his survey (Exhibit P-T) . In the face of this undisputed
evidence, it is difficult to see how anyone can seriously
claim that the lake had somehow permanently lowered
between the Stansbury survey and the date of statehood.
Even more striking is the fact that the water level
of the Great Salt Lake would have been four feet higher
at statehood if the water produced by nature had been
permitted to flow into the lake. The actual water level
would have reached the meander line, if upstream impoundments, diversions, and consumptive uses by man
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had not intercepted the waters on the tributaries to the
lake (Exhibit P-D-II). The argument that artificial
acts and uses by man cannot deprive the State of title is
made under Section C. 1., supra, and it is simply observed at this point that, but for the interferences by
man, nature would have raised the lake to an elevation
at statehood which would have been four feet higher
than it was at the time of Stansbury's survey, enabling
the State to argue, with some logic, that the high water
line at statehood was therefor four feet higher than the
surveyed meander. But the State has declined to do so.
e. The State of Utah has always Recognized
the Meander Line to be the High 'iV ater
Line, and thus the Boundary Line.
Admittedly, if the State has errouneously assumed
an incorrect boundary line to be a correct boundary line,
that assumption does not change the boundary line.
While it might be true that issues could be raised as to
adverse possession, statute of limitations, estoppel, and
otherwise, whereby upland claimants might be defeated
in their belated claim to ownership, particularly in the
face of 75 years of state control, management, and dominion of the exposed lands around the lake, such issues
are not present in this litigation.
The discussion at this juncture is simply to show
that, for purposes of administering the exposed lands in
question, there has been no boundary available or suggested (until recently) other than the surveyed meander. A brief review will show that the Utah Legislature,
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the State Land Board and the Utah Attorney General
haYe consistently viewed the surveyed meander as the
boundary line.

It was in 1911 when the Utah Legislature enacted
Chapter 48, Laws of Utah 1911 (now codified as Section 65-1-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953), authorizing
leases by the State of the beds of navigable waters below
the "water's edge." The phrase "water's edge" obviously
was intended by the legislature to refer to the high water
line, or meander line. This is made clear by the fact that
Attorney General A. R. Barnes advised Governor William Spry that legislation was needed to grant authority
to the State Board of Land Commissioners to lease state
owned lands below "high water mark" (Biennial Report
of Attorney General, November 30, 1910, p. 12) ; Governor Spry recommended to the Legislature on January
IO, 1911 that the legislature "delegate power to the State
Board of Land Commissioners to lease the lands below
the high water mark of Great Salt Lake" (Governor's
Message to the Ninth Legislature of the State of Utah,
January 10, 1911, p. 26) ; and at all times since, the
phrase "water's edge" has been interpreted to mean the
surveyed meander line. Thus, in 1922, Attorney General Harvey H. Cluff advised that, in his opinion, the
State owned the land "below the meander line established by the government at statehood" (Biennial Report of the Attorney General, November 30, 1922, p.
270) ; and this view continued without question, and as
recently as May 16, 1956, the Utah Attorney General
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used the phrase ''high water mark" as identical to "meander line" in referring to state ownership of the bed of
the Great Salt Lake (Biennial Report of the Attorner
General, June 30, 1956, p. 167).
·
Consequently, the Land Board, from statehood,
asumed and has continued the management and control
of all lands below the surveyed meander line. Illustrative of this is Rule 24 {e) of the Rules and Regulatio111
Governing the Issuance of Mineral Leases of the Utah
State Land Board, which proYides that:
"The term 'State lands within, under or around
the Great Salt Lake' as used in Rules 24 and 25
shall include all State lands lying within the e\terior boundary lines (extended to close) of the
meander line around said lake as surveyed by the
United States."
The Utah Legislature has continued to follow this
consistent interpretation and practice by the State Land
Board and Utah Attorney General, and indicative of
this is Section 23-8-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
where the Fish and Game Commission is given authority
to develop lands within the "surveyed meander line" of
the Great Salt Lake, and the statute specifically refers
to the meander line as the boundary in six separate instances. The same is true in Section 23-8-2, where the
reference is broader, giving a right in the public to hunt.
fish and trap upon lands owned by the State "laying
below the official government meander line or liiqh'u.Yder line of the navigable waters" [emphasis a<l<le<ll
12-t

Thus, by March 17, 1965, the Director of the Utah
Land Board declared, to a Congressional Committee,
that:
"!lightly or wrongly, the State has assumed
ownership and has exercised dominion and control over the lands since the time of statehood.
The Government (Federal) did not seriouslv
assert title until 1961." (Exhibit P-U, p. 49). ·
And, on February 23, 1966, Governor Calvin L.
Rampton was to explain to a Congressional Committee
that:
"Utah has assumed ownership of the Great
Salt Lake and the lakebed lands since statehood.
Utah's claim is based upon assumed navigability
of the lake. It is well settled law that a State owns
title to lands forming the bed of navigable lakes
and streams within its boundaries .... The State
has asumed the boundary of the lake-bed lands
to be the edge of the survey or the meander line
and that this is a fixed boundary, despite the falling level of the lake.
"Utah believed that there are many reasons
the
why equities were with the State
ernment (Federal) should give Utah its claim to
the relicted lands. We believe these equities still
exist. Utah has assumed ownership of the lands
for a long period of time-since statehood. The
G-overnment has tacitly agreed to the assumed
State ownership until 1961. There is a basic unfairness in asserting a claim at this late date, particularly where, as here, the State
rights in third parties who would be m.Jured.
(Exhibit P-V, pp. 138-39).
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The "third parties" referred to by Governor Ramp.
ton were the lessees of the State, and he testified thal
during the five year period from 1961 to 1966 the lease
rentals and royalties received by the State from minerals
alone exceeded $1,000,000.00 (Exhibit P-V, p. 146).
Other values of state ownership are less tangible.
:For example, John E. Phelps, Director of the Utah Division of :Fish and Game, testified at the Congressional
Hearings that the State had spent $1, 700,000 developing
41,850 acres in waterfowl areas below the meander line,
and that there was an additional 131,500 acres of natural
habitat below the meander line; but that the true value
for waterfowl recreation, if measured against prices paid
by sportsmen elsewhere, would be astronomical. (Exhibit P-U, pp. 51, 55).
f. The Meander Line is the only Feasible
Boundary.
The surveyed meander represents a clearly identi·
fiable line appearing on all official federal, state and
county land records, and is the described boundary in all
patents issued by the United States. It has been
accepted without question for over 65 years (from statehood until 1961). It is known that the water's edge is not
the boundary line, but that the mean high water line at
statehood is the boundary. The mere fact that a high
water line cannot be surveyed as of 1896 to locate a
physical mark is no reason to abandon the high water
line as the boundary. The meander line fully, fairly, and
logically serves that purpose, and is supported by ample
legal precedent.
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To argue that the water's edge should serve as the
boundary is to argue absurdity. The rapidly fluctuating
water level would create chaos as a boundary. 'Vith the
level of the water changing from month to month, either
inundating or uncovering many thousands of acres, how
could any owner identify his land, much less manage or
utilize it. 'Vhere would one build fences, where would
one issue leases, what would happen if an oil well were
drilled and production obtained at a point that was water
covered six months of the year and bare six months of
the year (or what would happen if the wind carried the
water to cover the land around the oil well for a few
.hours a day, several days a month)?
The magnitude of the consequences of a fluctuating
boundary ought not be discounted. The land involved is
more than a few acres each year. In fact, as stated above,
in any given year the water level will fluctuate to expose
or inundate in excess of 100,000 acres, and it is not uncommon for the water to rise or recede so as to cover or
uncover 200,000 acres within three or four months' time
(see Exhibit P-U, p. 125, Exhibit P-CC).
There would be no end of confusion if any boundary
other than the surveyed meander line were to be selected.
Obviously, the water's edge is no boundary in law, has
no basis in fact, would be totally confusing from an administrative standpoint, and would be wholly unconscionable in view of state expenditures and development.
Not only that, but what about the fact that the State
would never have access to its state owned bed if the
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water's edge were to be the boundary? How could the
State, the public, or the state's lessees get to the water's
edge if the water's edge were the boundary? There would
be no way, short of helicopter or condemnation. How
about the Great Salt Lake beaches, where the concessionaires are lessees of the State? Their leases would be
of no effect, and there would be no recreational access
to the lake. The same would be true of the mineral lessees, the brine shrimp lessees, the Utah Geological Survey scientific operations, and a host of other necessary
uses of the lake. Suffice to say that the water's edge is
not and cannot be a boundary.
What, then, is the boundary, if not the surveyed
meander line? Should another line be surveyed, at some
other elevation? If so, what line at what elevation?
Should an effort be made to survey the actual water
level at the date of statehood? That is as unsound as a
survey or adaption of the water level today to serve as
the boundary line. But if that, or any other elevation,
were to be considered as a possible alternative, it can
quickly be rejected as impossible.
Consider the following explanation of John A.
Carver, Jr., Under Secretary of the Department of the
Interior:
"Although the lake surface and hence the
shoreline is level at any given time, the study of
lake deposits reveal that older shorelines are no
longer level. Those 'differential changes'.
(I ) regional tilting, ( 2) warping due to isostatic
unloading, and ( 3) local changes due to earth128

or ground subsidence. All three changes
are evident near the Great Salt Lake. Differential changes have been reported along the northern edge of the Great Salt Lake following an
earthquake in Hansel Valley in 1934. There was
a rather substantial quake. I recall it myself.
"Changes between the land surveys of 1934 and
those of 1850 amount to between 4 and 6 feet
over an area of several square miles. About afoot
of this is believed to have occurred rapidly at the
1934 earthquake; the remainder during the time
between 1850 and the Hansel Y alley earthquake
of 1934. Our geologists believe that similar effects
may be present at many other places on the lake
shore where there are no old surveys to provide a
means of recognizing them.
"Our cadastral engineers tell us ... that the
recovery of any shoreline that existed before the
Hansel Valley earthquake of 1934 could not be
accomplished with any degree of accuracy. That
is, that warping of the surface of the land in 1934
would make it difficult from a cadastral engineer
standpoint to recover a line prior to 1934." (Exhibit P-U, pp. 125-27).
''Thile it would thus be impossible to survey or reconstruct any elevation whatsoever for any date prior to
the earthquake of 1934, the surveyed meander line of
18.55 was not affected, for that survey had already been
located and established, and its accuracy (or at least location) remained intact:
"IJfr. Sa:1Jlor: On Monday of this week when we
had testimony, or the statement was read into the

record, there was evidence presented that from
time to time in this area there have been variations
in the surface of the land involved in this litigation due to earthquakes. Do you know whether or
not these earthquakes have caused any variation
in the line of 1855?

"Mr. Carver: Oh, the earthquake could not
change the line of 1855, because that is a surveyed
line on the ground." (Exhibit P-V, p. 157)
Thus, it is now impossible to survey, with any degree of accuracy, any line or elevation of the lake as it
existed prior to 1934. But the surveyed meander was
established prior to that date, and was not affected by
the subsidence.
g. Summary
The present point of argument has, to this juncture,
consisted of sub-points "a" through "f." This sub-point
"g" is designed as a summary of the foregoing. There is
no desire on the part of the State to again set forth the
above facts, authorities, and arguments. On the contrary, the emphasis here is to assure that the preceeding
detail has not been so extensive as to obscure the basic
essentials of the present argument. Both the facts and
the law are clear and beyond dispute in this proceeding.
This summary is intended to extract from the foregoing
only the heart of the present argument, which is:
(1) The Essential Fact: In 1850, Captain Stansbury surveyed a meander line which he located at
the high water line of the lake, and the evidence
is uncontroverted that his survey was the only one
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ever
for the purpose of locating such a high
water hne, was and is more reliable than any survey that could have been made at statehood or at
any subsequent time, and the Stansbury survey
thus fully established as a matter of fact that the
meander line was the high water line at the date
of survey;
(2) The Applicable Law: A meander line, once
surveyed to establish a high water line, is presumed in law to continue to be the high water and
thus the true boundary between the state-owned
bed and adjoining uplands; and, while any party
may assume the burden of proving by competent
evidence that the forces of nature have located
the high water line at some other elevation, that
has not happened in this case, and the presumption implied in law as to the continued validity of
the meander line as the boundary must stand.

The trial court had abundant support in fact and
law when it found:
The Great Salt Lake was surveyed under the direction of Captain Howard Stansbury in 1850 for
the express purpose of locating and establishing a
mean high water mark which would segregate
the bed of the lake from the public domain; difficulties were encountered during that survey in
locating such a mark either by a vegetation line
or a wave action erosion line, because the briny
waters have saturated surrounding lands with
salts which prevent the growth of any definitive
vegetation line, and the very flat shore lands,
coupled with highly fluctuating water levels, prevent the formation of any mark from wave erosion; there is no reason to believe that the me:mrler line surveyed by Stansbury at what he con-
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sidered to be the high water line was not as accurate as any such line that could have been smveyed at that time or at any subsequent time; ...
(Finding of Fact No. 4, R. 285-286)
and thus concluded:
The boundary line separating prirntely owne<l
uplands from the state-owned bed of navigable
waters is usually located with reference to a physical mark on the ground, identified either bv a
vegetation line where the vegetation stops
to
frequent, regular and prolonged inundation 11t
high water which prevents the growth of vegetation, or by an erosion line caused by wave action
when the 'vater level reaches a high cycle with
reasonable frequency and regularity and for a
sufficient duration to permit such erosion to take
place. If no party in a proceeding to establish
such a boundary line contends for or proceeds by
evidence to establish such a mark as the mean
high water line, and thus the boundary, the court
may properly presume the surveyed meander line
to be the mean high water line, and thus the boundary, if such meander line, at the time of
was intended to establish the mean high water
line. Since, in the present proceeding, the surveyed meander line was intended to locate the
mean high water line; and since neither party has
offered proof that such meander line was erroneously established, or that the mean high water
line ha·s changed since the date of survey, or that
it was at any other elevation at the date of statehood or at any time since statehood; and since it
appears that no mean high water line could haw
been surveyed by reference to a physical mark at
statehood; and since no line could be surveyed.
with or without reference to a physical mark, for

any elevation which might have existed prior to
the earthquake in 1934; and since the meander
line as surveyed reasonably approximates in fact
where the mean high water line was at statehood,
and would be today absent artificial diversions
from and impoundments on the tributaries to the
lake-the surveyed meander line should be presumed in law to be the mean high water line of the
lake as of the date of statehood and continuing to
the present time, and thus the boundary between
privately owned uplands and the state-owned bed.
(Conclusion of Law No. 4 (a) , R. 288-9)
Hardy has cited no evidence, no relevant authority,
and no arguments to suggest how or why the fore going
finding and conclusion should be disaf firmed.
It must be concluded that the State of Utah, on
January 4, 1896, received title to the bed of the Great

Salt Lake, and the bed as thus defined on that date included all of the area within the surveyed meander of
the lake: and that the title and ownership of the State
has not been divested or diminished, except by legislatively authorized leases issued by the Utah Division of
State Lands.
CONCLUSION
Hardy has at times in its brief suggested that this
Court should decide fewer issues than did the trial court,
or that this Court might properly decide nothing at all,
waiting to see what the ultimate decision might be by the
United States Supreme Court in the pending action by
1Ttah against the United States. The latter case will in
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no way resolve the issues in this case. And there is no wa 1
to resolve the ownership questions in this case
deciding the questions argued on appeal.
The land in dispute is adjacent to and below the
surveyed meander line. The State claims title because
(I) the State became the owner of the bed at statehood
( 2) the bed included everything within the high water
mark or line; ( 3) the surveyed meander line is deemed in
law and fact to be the high water line, and hence the
boundary; and ( 4) the doctrine of reliction has not divested the State of title to this land. Absent this sequence
of arguments, or "chain of title," ownership cannot be
effectiYely adjudicated.
With respect to the merits of this appeal, it is impossible to set forth in any concise manner a review of
all of the issues. No such attempt will be made.
It is important to emphasize, however, that the result contended for by Hardy would require this Courl
to:
I. Advance the riparian rights regime in Utah;

2. Upset settled and established land titles
mineral leases which serve as the basis for multi·
million dollar deye}opment;

3. Divest by common law doctrine the title of the
State to all minerals in the exposed lands, as well
as the lands themselves (despite express legislation declaring that such minerals may be leased
but cannot be sold) ;
4. Reject the protective mandate of the _Dtah
Constitution governing lakebed lands, as mter·
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preted by numerous opinions of the Utah Attorney General, as initially applied by this Court in
State v. Rolio and consistently followed thereafter, as confirmed by several legislative declarations governing administration of the exposed
lands, and as implemented administratively, since
statehood, by state agencies and boards.
The lower court carefully examined numerous exhibits and other evidence in light of the governing legal
principles, and then made precise fin dings and conclusions to resolve all of the issues that had to be decided.
It is submitted that the Findings, Conclusions, and Decree of the lower court should in all respects be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Utah Attorney General
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Deputy Utah Attorney General
DALLIN W. JENSEN
Assistant Attorney General
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON
Special Assistant Attorney General
EDWARD W. CLYDE
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236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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APPENDIX A: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS
ENTEREDBYTHELOWERCOURT
1. Utah was admitted into the Union of the United
States of America on January 4, 1896, and on that date,
under Federal law granting equal footing with all other
states, received title to the beds of all navigable lakes
and streams located within the state.

2. Federal law controls to determine whether a
body of water is navigable for purposes of state title
under the equal footing doctrine of the United States
Constitution. A lake is navigable under federal law
when it is navigable in fact; and it is navigable in fact
if it was nayigated, or was susceptible of being navigated, at the date of statehood. Evidence of actual
navigation at or near the date of statehood is not necessary, but such evidence is most persuasive to demonstrate
navigable capacity. On January 4, 1896, the Great Salt
Lake was navigable under federal law, and title to the
bed thereof vested in the State of Utah.
3 (a). State, rather than federal, law applies to
determine whether Utah has been divested of any part
of its title to the bed of the Great Salt Lake. To the
extent that the doctrine of reliction is a part of the
common law of Utah. it applies only when the water
leYel of a ntlYigable body of water, through natural
processes, gradually and imperceptibly lowers, permanentlv exposin(J' lands that had once been a part of the
the lak;; and, even in such a situation, reliction
bed
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claims cannot extend below the mean high water line
at statehood. As a matter of law, the lands around the
Great Salt Lake that have been exposed prior to and
since statehood by the lowering water level of the lake
are not reliction lands, because they have been exposed,
in the main, by artificial interferences by man on the
tributaries of the lake, and the changes thus effected
have not been gradual, imperceptible and permanent,
but have been rapid, perceptible, and highly temporary.
3 ( b) . All lands owned by the State of Utah at
statehood including the beds of navigable waters, may
be encumbered or divested only by affirmative administrative act of the State performed in accordance with
statutory authority, or by express legislation recognizing claims under common law doctrines. Otherwise, no
common low doctrine, such as reliction, can divest the
State of title.
4 (a). The boundary line separating privately
owned uplands from the state-owned bed of navigable
waters is usually located with reference to a physical
mark on the ground, identified either by a vegetation
line where the vegetation stops due to frequent, regular
and prolonged inundation at high water which prevents
the growth of vegetation, or by erosion line caused by
wave action when the water level reaches a high cycle
with reasonable frequency and regularity and for a
sufficient duration to permit such erosion to take place.
If no party in a proceeding to establish such a boundary
line contends for or proceeds by evidence to establish
such a mark as the mean high water line, and thus the
boundary, the court may properly presume the surveyed
meander line to be the mean high water line, and thus
the boundary, if such meander line, at the time of
survey, was intended to establish the mean high water
line. Since, in the present proceeding, the surveyed
meander line was intended to locate the mean high water
line; and since neither party has offered proof that such
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meander line was erroneously established, or that the
mean high water line has changed since the date of
survey, or that it was at any other elevation at the
date of statehood or at any time since statehood; and
since it appears that no mean high water line could
have been surveyed by reference to a physical mark
at statehood; and since no line could be surveyed, with
or without reference to a physical mark, for any elevation which might have existed prior to the earthquake of 1934; and since the meander line as surveyed
reasonably approximates in fact where the mean high
water line was at statehood, and would be today absent
artificial diversions from and impoundments on the
tributaries to the lake - the surveyed meander line
should be presumed in law to be the mean high water
line of the lake as of the date of statehood and continuing to the present time, and thus the boundary
between privately owned uplands and the state-owned
bed.
4 ( b). Since it has been determined ( 1) that the
State of Utah received title to the bed of the Great
Salt Lake on January 4, 1896, when Utah obtained
statehood; (2) that the surveyed meander line fairly
represents in fact, and is presumed to be in law, the
mean high water line of the lake and thus the boundary
between the privately owned uplands and the stateowned bed; and (3) that the doctrine of reliction is inapplicable to the exposed shore lands around the Great
Salt Lake, and, in any event, such a common law doctrine could not divest the State of title in the absence
of express legislation consenting thereto-it therefore
must be concluded that the State of Utah, and not the
Hardy Salt Company, owns the 32.2 acres of exposed
lands situated adjacent to fee land owned by the Har.dy
Salt Company but below the surveyed meander lme
of the Great Salt Lake, and utilized by the State Road
Commission for highway purposes. (R. 287-290)
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APPENDIX B: JUDGMENT AND DECREE
AS ENTERED BY LO,VER COURT
NO'V THEREFORE, the court being fullr
advised in the premises, and acting in accordance witi1
said Findings of :Fact and Conclusions of Law, hereb1
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as fof.
lows:
1. Title to the bed of the Great Salt Lake vesteJ
in the State of Utah on January 4, 189ti, when Utah
obtruined statehood, pursuant to the Equal
doctrine of the United States Constitution, because the
lake was a navigable body of water at statehood.

2. The bed of the lake at statehood consiste1l of all
of the area within the surveyed meander line of the lake.
The State has not been diYested of any part of its title
to the bed of the lake because:

a. The common la'v doctrine of reliction is nnf
applicable to the Great Salt Lake, because the fiuctu·
ating water level is not the result of natural causes. i1
not gradual and imperceptible, and is not permanent.
b. Even if the common law doctrine of reliction
should be deemed applicable, the Utah Constitution
protects the state ownership of the beds of na Yignble
lakes, and no common law doctrine can divest the stalt
of its title. The state's title can only be divested or en·
cumbered when an appropriate st;te agency affirma·
tively acts in accordance with authority specificalh
gran.ted by the Utah Legislature.
.
c. The suneved meander line of the lake i
implied in law to represent. and in fact fairly represenll
the mean hiO'h water line of the lake at statehood, ano
thus the
between the state-mvned bed min
privately owned t{plands. Since statehood. and continu
ing to the present day, the meander line has been a fixel
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and permanent boundary line that has not changed or
tiuctuated.
3. Unless disposed of by affirmative administrative
grant by the State of Utah in accordance with the
statutory authority, the lands situated below and within
the surveyed meander line of 1850, at an elevation above
mean sea level of approximately 4205 feet, are owned
by the State of Utah and are under the jurisdiction
of plaintiff Division of State Lands. As such, the 32.2
acres of land in dispute in this proceeding, as described
i11 the amended complaint on file herein, and as situated
adjacent to fee land owned by the defendant but below
the surveyed meander line of the Great Salt Lake,
and as utilized by plaintiff State Road Commission for
highway purposes, is owned by said State Road Commission pursuant to the deed it received from the Division of State Lands of the State of Utah. (R.307-8)

APPENDIX C:

EXPLANATORY BACK-

GROUND OF PRESENT LITIGATION
1. CO ...\IPLEX10N OF l>Rh:.SEN'l'

TION

The present action was filed as an eminent domain
proceeding by the State Road Commission against the
Hardy Salt Company, seeking to condemn fee land
owned by Hardy located adjacent to the surveyed
meander line of the Great Salt Lake at the southern
shore of the lake in Tooele County.
The Hardy Salt Company is a private corporation
that owns and operates a commercial salt processing
facility in Tooele County, near the southern shore of
the Great Salt Lake. Hardy withdraws water from the
lake pursuant to a permit issued by the Division of
\/Vater Rights of the State of Utah, and extracts salt
therefrom pursuant to a royalty agreement with the
Division of State Lands of the State of Utah. Hardy's
method of extracting salt for commercial sale requires
a series of evaporation ponds, some of which have been
constructed on fee land owned by Hardy and some of
which have been constructed on land which Hardy has
leased from the State of Utah.
\Vhen Interstate Highway 80 was designed along
the southern shore of the Great Salt Lake, a section
of the highway was located across fee land owned by
Hardy and a section was located below the surveyed
meander line (across exposed land situated between
the meander line and the present water's edge of the
lake). The latter parcel of property consisted of 32.2
acres of unimproved land located adjacent to and
directly below fee land owned by Hardy. The Road
Commission believed this exposed land to be owned by
the State of Utah, purchased the land needed for the
highway from the Division of State Lands of the State
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of Utah, and thus proceeded to condemn only the fee
land owned by Hardy and needed for the highway.
Hardy filed a counterclaim against the Road Commission, claiming ownership by reliction of the exposed
land which the Commission had purchased from the
Division of State Lands, and thus also placed in direct
issue the ownership of the remaining exposed land not
utilized for the highway but situated between
fee land and the present water's edge of the lake. Consequently, the Division of State Lands was deemed to
be an indispensable party and was made a party by
order of the district court, pursuant to a stipulation
hr counsel for the parties and the voluntary consent
of the Division of State Lands to join as a party plaintiff with the State Road Commission. Counsel for the
parties thereupon decided to litigate the question of
ownership of the exposed land prior to trial on the
question of compensation. If Hardy owns the land in
dispute, then it will be necessary to obtain new appraisals as to the value of land taken and the damage
to land severed; if Hardy does not own the land in
dispute, then new appraisals will not be required.
Hence, the only issues presently before the court for
determination are those related to ownership of the
exposed land located between the fee land of Hardy
and the present water's edge of the lake.
2. SURVEY OF MEANDER LINE.

The following facts are generally known, and are
useful only to explain the background of the l?resent
litigation. Brigham Young and the Mormon pioneers
entered the Salt Lake Valley on July 24, 1847. The
following year {1848) the United States acquired from
Mexico a vast territory, including what IS now the
State of Utah. In 1849 the United States Government
sent Captain Howard Stansbury and a survey party
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to the sh?res of the Great Salt Lake to survey a
meander lme around the lake. Sta1_1sbury's survey party
attempted to locate the
lme at the high water
line of the lake, although the saline nature of the lake
and the surrounding lands made it difficult to establish
such a line with precision. The field survey was completed by .May of 1850, but the survey notes were not
officially approved by the United States Surveyor
General until 1855. Consequently, the meander line
as surveyed by Stansbury at an elevation of approximately 4205 feet above mean sea level is commonly
referred to as the "1855 surveyed meander" of the Great
Salt Lake. Certain later surveys have been made to
establish portions of the meander line not surveyed by
Stansbury, and the final portions of the meander line
were not surveyed until 1966.

3. MEANDER LINE AS DEEDED BOUNDARY LINE OF PRIVATE CLAI1\'1ANTS
The only aspect of present significance under this
point with respect to the surveyed meander line is that
it was intended to separate the bed and shore of the
lake from the surrounding public domain, and thus
identify and delineate the public domain ayailable for
sale or disposition by the United States. Accordingly,
the meander line as surveyed appears on the official
records and plats of the Utah Land Off ice of the United
States Department of Interior, on the official records
and plats of the Division of State Lands of the State
of Utah, and on the official records and plats of the
county recorders of each county wherein a part of the
meander line of the lake is located. In each instance
where the United States has issued a patent to part
of the public domain located adjacent to the
line, the patent has described the specific acreage withm
the tract but has not purported to convey any land
located below the surveyed meander. Thus, the meander
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line is the deeded boundary line of private ownership
by those who have obtain patents from the United
States. If today there is a different boundary, it must
result from the common law doctrine of reliction, and
not from the issuance of patents by the United States.
J. HIGH \V ATER LINE AS BOUNDARY

LINE OF STATE OF UTAH

\\Then each state is admitted into the Union, it
receives title to the beds of all navigable lakes and
streams located within its borders. The bed of a lake
or stream includes the water covered bed as well as the
shore, and thus includes all of the area within the mean
high water line. The shore is that area between the
water's edge at any given time and the mean high water
line. The mean high water line is that line or elevation
reached by the water at its high level in an ordinary
year. Thus, most bodies of water experience seasonal
fluctuations from high water to low water, and when the
water level is at the mean high water line, the entire
bed is water covered, and when the water level is lower
than the mean high water line, part of the bed is ·water
covered and part is exposed (the exposed part is the
shore and is located between the water's edge and the
high water line) .
Thus, the boundary line separating the state owned
bed of a navigable body of water from the upland
riparian owners is the mean high water line (mark).
However, this boundary line is often simply characterized as the "high water mark" or the "high water
line" and the State has primarily used this latter terminology in this brief. Court decisions sometimes have
observed that the mean high water line is the same as
the mean high water mark. This is so because when a
body of' water reaches its ordinary high water level for
t1w seawn or year, the entire bed is covered with water
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for a long enough period to leave a physical mark on
the ground .at the point of high water. This physical
ma!k
appears as the point at which vegetation ends, with the area above the mean high water
line covered with vegetation and the area below denuded
of vegetation as a result of being inundated during
substantial parts of the year. Sometimes a physical
mark will appear at the mean high water line as a result
of erosion, resulting from the wave action of the lake
when the level is at mean high water.
Thus, while the water level of most bodies of water
fluctuates from high water to low water during each
year, the mean high water line does not fluctuate, but
remains constant. It is obvious that the high water level
(and the low water level for that matter) will not be
at the same exact elevation each year, for some years
nature will produce more water than other years. During
an unusually "wet" year with extraordinarily high pre·
cipitation, it is likely that the high water level for that
year will raise above the "mean" high water level; likewise, during a year of very low precipitation, the high
water level for that year probably will remain below
the "mean" high water line. But the mean high water
line does not change simply because in any given year
or years the high water level of a lake is above or below
the mean high water line, and the bed of the lake remains
constant as that area located within the high water
line. This is to say that in a year of unusually high
water, the level of the lake at its high point will tern·
porarily exceed the mean high water line and cover
an area larger than the bed of the lake; while in a
year of unusually low water, the level of the lake at
its high point will not reach the mean high water line,
and even at high water for that year there will be an
area of exposed shore between high water and the mean
high water line.
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5. RELICTION AS A COMMON LAW DOC-

TRINE CREATING A CHANGE IN
THE HIGH WATER LINE, AND THUS
A CHANGE IN BOUNDARY

It is possible for the high water line to change.
This occurs when nature, through changes in climate
and general precipitation patterns, causes a permanent
change in the seasonal fluctuations of the water level
of the lake. Lake Bonneville is perhaps an exaggerated
example of such a changing mean high water line,
because geologists can readily identify several levels
or ''stages" of the lake as it lowered, leaving physical
marks of erosion from wave action on the Wasatch
and Oquirrh Mountains, as well as on certain islands
in what is now the Great Salt Lake. The pertinent
observation with respect to these stages of Lake Bonneville is that the lake would endure a period of shrinking
or lowering and would then stabilize, resulting in a
"permanent" change in the high water line, and also
resulting in wave erosion creating a physical mark at
that line. Then, when the lake would lower further
and again stabilize, nature had again caused a "permanent" change in the cyclical fluctuation of the lake,
a new mean high water line would result, and a physical
mark through wave action erosion at that line would
emerge.

With respect to questions of land ownership, the
foregoing discussion serves to illustrate the problems
encountered when considering whether boundaries
should or do change when the water level of a navigable lake fluctuates. The state owns the bed of a
navigable lake, including all of the area withi? the
high water line. Those who own the upland ad,Jacent
to the high water line are riparian owners, and the
high water line is thus the boundary separating the
state owned bed from the riparian ownership. Riparian
owners generally claim a right to remain riparian own-
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ers with respect to the lake. Thus, when the processes 11
nature grad.ually and
cause a change u
the fiuctuatmg levels of the lake, so that the high wate:
changes, the boundary likewise changes to the ne1,
high water line, and the riparian owner thus remain,
a riparian owner. If the permanent change is at,
higher elevation of the high water line, the ripariar
?wner loses land t? the
if the
chang,
is at a lower elevation of the lugh water hne, the riparia1
owner gains land from the state under the common lal'
doctrine of reliction, and is still a riparian owner.
The state always remains the owner of the complett
bed of the lake; the riparian owner always remains :1
riparian owner by owning adjacent to the mean higl
water line; the boundary separating state ownersh1:
from private ownership does not fluctuate with tht
fluctuating water levels, but remains constant and per
manent (at least permanent in the sense that it 11'il1
change only when there has been a "permanent" changr
in the lake caused by nature). Thus, boundaries do 1111:
change from week to week, or month to month, or yeai
to year, and ordinarily not from decade to decade, but
onlv in those situations where the climate and loni
ter;n weather patterns change, resulting in a permanenl
change in the annual fluctuations of the lake. Of course
the water level at a particular time is immaterial t11
riparian ownership, for the riparian owner alway'
owns to the high water line, and thus owns to the
or shore, and it cannot be expected that the actual wateri
edge will always be at the mean high water level arnl
thus touching his boundary line.
The doctrine of reliction, then, is a common la\1
concept that says when a navigable body of water lowen
exposing lands that were once water covered,
whe1
such lowering is natural. gradual, imperceptible anti
permanent, that part of the exposed land situated aboYt
the new mean high water mark is relicted land, an<l r
1
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owned by the adjacent upland owner. After title to
reliction lands are thus acquired by the upland owner
the new mean high water line is the new
separating state ownership from private ownership, and
the state still owns the entire bed of the lake located
within the new boundary line, including the water
covered bed of the lake and the shore located between
the water's edge and the new high water line. So,
when the doctrine of reliction thus applies, there is no
change in the ownership relation between the state and
riparian owners - the state still owns the bed, the
riparian owner still owns adjacent to the bed. llut
there is a change in the amount of land owned, because,
since the bed has become smaller, the state owns less,
and the riparian owner by reliction owns more. But it
is the amount of land owned, and not the nature of the
relationship, that has changed.
ti.

THE GREA'T SALT LAKE: ARE THE
"EXPOSED" L A N D S
RELICTION

LANDS?

"Tith specific reference to the Great Salt Lake,
it is a fact that the present water level of the lake is
lower than it was on January 4, 1896 (statehood) when
Ctah obtained title. Thus, there exists today around
the shore of the Great Salt Lake a belt of land located
between the present water's edge and the surveyed
meander line. Since the shore areas surrounding the
lake are very flat in most areas, a relatively minor
ehange in the vertical elevation of the lake can result
in a substantial change in the size of the belt of exposed
lands around the lake. And it is this belt of exposed
land that has recently been the subject of many conflieting claims of m;nership. These claims
Jiaye centered around the doctrine of reliction, and arguments haYe been waged pro and con as to whether, or
to what extent the doctrine of reliction should apply
'
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to divest the State of land that was part of the bed of tn1
lake at statehood.
In general, it might be said that the State Yiew
the doctrine of reliction in the manner in which it ordi
narily is defined and applied, i.e., as being a natural
gradual, imperceptible, and permanent change in ,
body of \vater, resulting in a permanent change in tn,
mean high water line of the lake. The State contend,
that the doctrine of reliction should not apply at all tri
the exposed
but, if applicable at all, cannot appl,1
below the lugh water line at the date of statehood.
Specifically, the State argues that the doctrine ol
reliction should not apply because:
1

1. The water level has not lowered as a result ol
natural causes, but as a result of artificial causes (up·
stream impoundments, diversion and consumptin use1
which have prevented water from reaching the lake);

2. The fluctuations in the water level of the lakt
haYe not been and are not gradual and imperceptible.
but are marked, radical and substantial, even to tbr
extent that many thousands of acres are exposed or
inundated within a period of a few weeks;
3. The fluctuations are not permanent but an
highly temporary, and there has been no time in the
recorded history of the lake when it has appeared thnt
there has been a permanent change in the mean hig\1
water line of the lake.

Hardy, on the other hand, argues that the
distinctions are not sufficient to prevent the doctrine
of reliction from applying, and contends that the absencr
of any physical mark to show a high
line
require the doctrine of reliction to vest m Har?y titl'.
to all exposed lands down to the actual water. s edgt
of the lake. Hardy thus claims that it has a movmg anil
fluctuating boundary, always measured hr the actual
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water level at any given time, without regard to how
frequently or substantially the water level fluctuates.
7. POTENTIAL STARE DECISIS AFFECT

OF PRESENT LITIGATION

Perhaps brief comment should be made with respect
to the case entitled Utah v. United States of America,
No. 31 Original, filed as an original action in the United
States Supreme Court pursuant to specific legislation
authorizing such action. That case is the only litigation,
aside from the case at bar, actively being pursued with
respect to the ownership of the exposed lands around
the lake. As the case title indicates, the dispute is between Utah and the United States only, and does not
involve any private parties, such as Hardy. The only
connection between that case and the case at bar is that,
if the United States Supreme Court determines that
Utah law controls with respect to the reliction claims
of the United States in that proceeding, then the case
at bar may serve to clarify Utah law and might in some
measure determine the outcome of that case. However,
this case was not designed or instigated to achieve that
result. It simply arose, as already stated, as a condemnation action, and, by virtue of an order of occupancy, Interstate 80 has been in the process of construction for some time across the fee land of Hardy,
as well as across the exposed land claimed by Hardy.
Therefore, in order to afford Hardy just compensation
for land taken without unconscionable delay, it is necessary to proceed with this case. Parenthetically, it might
be noted that the United States, through its Department
of Justice, was invited to participate in this case but
declined to do so. Likewise, various private claimants,
such as Morton Salt Company, are familiar with the
case and could have participated amicus curiae, or otherwise, but have not done so.
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